Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Markets with Strategic
  Servers by Varma, Sushil Mahavir et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
03
76
2v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  9
 A
ug
 20
20
Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Markets with
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Motivated by applications in online marketplaces such as ridesharing, we study dynamic pricing
and matching in two-sided queues with strategic servers. We consider a discrete-time process in
which, heterogeneous customers and servers arrive. Each customer joins their type’s queue, while
servers might join a different type’s queue depending on the prices posted by the system operator
and an inconvenience cost. Then the system operator, constrained by a compatibility graph, de-
cides the matching. The objective is to maximize the profit minus the expected waiting times. We
develop a general framework that enables us to analyze a broad range of strategic behaviors. In
particular, we encode servers’ behavior in a properly defined cost function that can be tailored to
various settings. Using this general cost function, we introduce a novel probabilistic fluid problem
as an infinite dimensional optimization program. The probabilistic fluid model provides an upper
bound on the achievable profit. We then study the system under a large market regime in which
the arrival rates are scaled by η and present a probabilistic two-price policy and a max-weight
matching policy which results in O(η1/3) profit-loss. In addition, under a broad class of customer
pricing policies, we show that any matching policy has profit-loss Ω(η1/3). Conditional on a given
expected waiting time, we also establish scale-free lower and upper bounds for the profit. Our
asymptotic analysis provides insight into near-optimal pricing and matching decisions, and our
scale-free bounds provide insights into how different service levels impact the firm’s profit.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: queueing games, max-weight matching, dynamic pricing, two-sided
queues, ridesharing
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rise of the gig economy has brought dynamic pricing and matching to the foreground of two-
sided markets. Ridesharing and meal delivery platforms such as Uber, Lyft, or Doordash adjust
these levers so as to maintain a reliable system operation and manage their revenue. Dynamic
pricing and matching are essential for these markets as they determine not only the demand re-
sponse but also the behavior of strategic heterogeneous supply agents. A fundamental issue that
emerges in this context, however, is the misalignment of supply and demand preferences (or types).
At any given time, a supply unit might not be compatible with a specific type of demand request.
To mitigate this, in addition to implementing dynamic pricing and matching, some platforms have
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designed their market to give supply units the option of reporting their type. In ridesharing, for
example, drivers have the ability to set a specific destination (such as their home or their children’s
school)-effectively filtering the trips they are willing to serveâĂŤand the platformwill match them
with riders going in that direction. However, this can lead to undesirable outcomes because sup-
ply agents might misreport their types in order to boost their earnings. Indeed, highly profitable
destinations such as airports or concert venues are widely preferred by drivers in the ridesharing
market. This can negatively impact the performance of such systems by reducing the availability
of agents that are willing to serve other trips. The goal of this paper is to provide a framework
to analyze and characterize the optimal dynamic pricing and matching decisions in a two-sided
market in which supply units strategically report their type to the system operator.
We consider a general two-sided queueing system with strategic servers and customers arriving
stochastically in a discrete time setting. Servers and customers have different types and their com-
patibility is captured by a bipartite graph. In each time period, the system operator posts a price
for each type of customer and server. This leads to a fraction of customers and servers accepting
the price and joining the system. Each customer entering the system pays the price posted by the
system operator. Meanwhile, servers can misreport their type in order to maximize their utility,
which is given by the price of the reported type minus a type-specific inconvenience cost. At the
end of a time period, the system operator, constrained by the compatibility graph, decides which
server-customer pairs to match, and the matched pairs depart from the system.
The system operatorâĂŹs objective is to formulate a pricing and matching policy so that the
difference of the long-run profit obtained by the system operator and the long-run cost incurred
due to waiting times is maximized. To analyze the system, for a given policy, we consider a large
market regime in which all the arrival rates are scaled by η → ∞. Under this asymptotic regime,
any policy that is o(η) within the optimal objective is optimal.
1.1 Main Contributions
We develop a general discrete-time, game-theoretical, stochastic framework to study pricing and
matching decisions in two-sided markets in which supply agents can strategically misreport their
type. The main challenge in this problem is that the selfish behavior of servers leads to corre-
lated arrival rates across different types of servers. In particular, if the price for one type of server
changes, the arrival rates of all types of servers are affected. In turn, we show that the inherent
game-theoretical nature of the problem leads to a combinatorial problem formulation.
To tackle this challenge, we synthesize the strategic behavior of servers via a judiciously defined
cost function that corresponds to the total price paid to the servers by the system operator. We
formulate this function as an optimization problem with equilibrium constraints for a broad range
of strategic behaviors that servers might exhibit. Indeed, the generality of this formulation enables
us to encompass different scenarios: 1) selfish servers maximizing their own utility, 2) a system
in which incentive compatibility (truthful) constraints must be satisfied, 3) a partially incentive-
compatible system such that at least a fraction of servers are truthful, and 4) a non-game theoretic
model in which servers always report truthfully (c.f. [26]). We present relations between these
models using simulations and theoretical results.
Under a general cost function, we present the first-order approximation of the system as a prob-
abilistic fluid problem. Our fluid problem is novel in that it allows for probabilistic pricing policies
given by probability measures defined over the set of feasible prices. In turn, our fluid problem
is an infinite dimensional optimization problem. We begin the analysis by providing structural
properties for the probabilistic fluid problem. First, we establish that its optimal value provides an
upper bound on the profit obtained under any policy. We then present conditions under which
the probabilistic fluid problem is equivalent to a standard fluid problem, that is, conditions under
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which the optimal probability measure is a Dirac measure. We compare the optimal fluid objective
with different cost function models using simulations.
Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic two-price policy and max-weight matching policy
which attains the fluid upper bound asymptotically with O(η1/3) rate of convergence. An interest-
ing feature of the matching policy is that it doesn’t use the solution of the fluid problem. Instead,
it follows state-dependent matching decisions. The pricing policy is an ϵ perturbation of the one
prescribed by the fluid problem. It is probabilistic and state-independent for servers, and a dy-
namic two-price policy for customers. We also show that under a broad class of customer pricing
policies, any matching policy will result in Ω(η1/3) profit loss. In addition, under the probabilis-
tic two-price policy, given a desired expected queue length, we present scale-free bounds on the
achievable profit. This provides insights on the attainable profit for a firm given a desired service
level.
1.2 Literature Review
Dynamic Pricing
Dynamic Matching
Games
for
Two Sided Queues
Queues
Ride Hailing (Applications)
Fig. 1. Overview: Literature Review.
In this paper, we consider dynamic pricing and matching for two sided queues with servers as
individual decision makers. We discuss each of these separately.
1.2.1 Two-Sidedeues. Different variants of two-sided queues were studied in the literature. [6]
pointed out that a two-sided queue is fundamentally unstable. They analyzed a two-sided queueing
model given by a bipartite graph and deduced necessary conditions on the arrival rates for stability.
The results were extended by [1]. [9] considered a more general model of two-sided queues: match-
ing queues, which is a multi-sided queue. They presented a matching policy and proved that it is
asymptotically optimal with rate of convergence O(η1/2) where arrival rates are scaled by η. [18]
considered a two-sided queueing model with server arrivals by invitation and also allowed cus-
tomers and servers to abandon the system. There are numerous applications of two sided queues,
such as routing cryptocurrency in payment processing networks [27], ridesharing systems [4] and
[5], general setting of dynamic matching markets [2], and dynamic barter exchange [3].
1.2.2 Dynamic Pricing. Dynamic pricing is a fundamental problem in the revenue management
literature [25]. In the context of queueing theory, different models have been considered in [16],
[15], [7], and [22]. The main results in these paper present different structural properties of the
optimal pricing policy by studying the underlying control problem. Some of the papers involving
dynamic pricing which are closely related to our work are presented in detail below.
[21] consider the joint problem of dynamic pricing and matching in a general setting. Their
objective is to maximize the total number of matches in a finite time. They consider the same
asymptotic regime as ours and provide asymptotically optimal policy but do not provide the rate
of convergence to the optimum. The setting of joint optimization of pricing andmatching decisions
was also considered in [20] and they also allowed the servers to be strategic.
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[14] consider the fundamental problem of dynamic pricing on an M/M/1 queue. They consider
customers joining the system depending on the offered price and their waiting times. The objective
is to maximize the profit of the system operator. They present an asymptotically optimal pricing
policy and also provide the rate of convergence.
1.2.3 Dynamic Matching. Dynamic Matching is a fundamental problem in two-sided queues with
heterogeneous customer and server arrivals. A FCFS matching discipline was studied by [6] and
[1]. In a related context, [9] considered a multi-sided matching queue and provided an asymp-
totically optimal matching policy. Delayed matching (batching) in the hope that better matching
opportunities will arrive in the future was analyzed by [3] and [2]. In both these papers, they con-
cluded that delayed matching does not provide significant benefits. Some of the papers involving
dynamic matching that are close to our work are presented in detail below.
[12] consider a two sided market given by a bipartite graph with associated penalties depending
on the type of demand and supply matched. Their objective is to find a matching policy which
maximizes the discounted reward in finite time. They present multiple structural properties of the
optimal matching policy and also present an asymptotically optimal matching policy.
Our paper is an extension of the work by [26], where a similar model was considered. There are
two key differences. They did not consider the game theoretic behavior of servers. This addition
to the model results in fundamentally different problem and optimal policy. In addition, unlike
this paper, we consider a discrete time model and a more realistic general arrival process. This
generalization results in technical difficulties and more involved proofs.
1.2.4 eueing Games. The book by [11] provides a complete overview on game theory applied
to queueing systems. In the present paper, with a large number of servers arriving in the system,
we are dealing with non atomic games. [8] deal with non atomic games and show that equilib-
rium constraints can be equivalently written as a fixed point equation. [17] provides a comprehen-
sive theory of solving and reformulation of the optimization problem with equilibrium constraint
which is known to be NP-hard. A comprehensive background on algorithmic game theory can be
found in [19].
We combine all these aspects that has been studied in the literature. In particular, we combine
dynamic pricing, dynamic matching in a strategic setting and carry out fluid as well as stochastic
analysis. Allowing probabilistic policies is a novel approach of formulating the fluid model. These
leads to a probabilistic optimal pricing policy and it seems to be fundamental to the systems with
strategic behavior and is novel in the literature.
1.3 Notation
We denote the set of real numbers, the set of non negative real numbers, the set of integers and the
set of non negative integers by R, R+, Z and Z+ respectively. In addition, we denote the extended
real line R∪ {∞,−∞} by R¯. We denote the set of natural numbers from 1 to n by [n]. In the entire
paper, we use 1, i and n for parameters concerning servers and 2, j andm for customers.We refer to
servers by she/her/her and to customers by he/his/him. In the entire paper, vectors are boldfaced.
We denote a vector of zeros of dimension n by 0n and a vector of ones of sizem by 1m . We omit
the subscript if the dimension of the vector is clear from the context. For two vectors x ∈ Rn and
y ∈ Rm , we denote the concatenated vector z ∈ Rn+m by z = (x, y). The dot product of two vectors
is denoted by 〈., .〉. For functions Fj : R → R with j ∈ [m] and a vector λ ∈ Rm , we write F (λ)
to denote (F1(λ1), . . . , Fm(λm)). For two matrices A and B of sizem × n, the sum of the entries of
their Hadamard product is denoted by A ◦ B, that is, A ◦ B =
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1 Ai jBi j . Expectation of a
random variable µ with probability measure α is denoted as Eα [µ]. Variance of a random variable
is denoted by Var [.] and co-variance is denoted by Cov [., .]. For two random variables X and Y , if
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P [X ≤ a] ≤ P [Y ≤ a] for all a ∈ R, then we say thatX stochastically dominatesY and denote it by
X ≥s .t . Y . Quantities pertaining to the fluid model are denoted with a ‘tilde’ on top and quantities
pertaining to the steady state of the stochastic model are denoted with a ‘bar’ on top.
2 MODEL
We consider a general two-sided, discrete time queueing system modeled as a bipartite graph
G(N1 ∪ N2, E). We refer to G(N1 ∪ N2, E) as the compatibility graph, where N1 = [n] is the set
of server types, N2 = [m] is the set of customer types, and E is the set of compatible edges that
represent the feasible matches between customers and servers. Each node in the graph denotes
a queue of a customer/server waiting to be matched. In each time slot, first, the system operator
determines prices for each customer and server queue. Then, agents arrive to the system and,
given the prices, make joining decisions. Customers always join their type’s queue, while servers
can strategically choose which queue to join. After this, the system operator matches (possibly) the
compatible pairs of customers and servers waiting in the system. Next, we present each component
of the model in detail.
We denote the state of the system at time k by {q(k) ∈ Zn+m
+
: k ∈ Z+}, where the vector is
defined as q = (q(1)1 , . . . ,q
(1)
n ,q
(2)
1 , . . . ,q
(2)
m ) and q
(1)
i (k) is the number of servers in the i type queue
waiting in the system at time k , andq(2)j (k) is the number of j type customers waiting in the system
at time k . The state space of the system is denoted by S ⊆ Z(n+m)
+
.
Customers. We denote the arrival of customers of type j by a sequence of independent ran-
dom variables {a(2)j (k) : k ∈ Z+} for all j ∈ [m] with mean E
[
a
(2)
j (k)
]
= λj (k). We assume
|a
(2)
j (k)| ≤ Amax with probability 1 for all j ∈ [m] and for all k ∈ Z+. We allow the arrivals to be
correlated across types but they are independent across time. We denote the co-variance matrix
of the arrival vector a(2)(k) by Σ(2). The mean arrival rate λ(k) is determined by the price posted
by the system operator and the demand curve for the respective type of customer. Mathematically,
we have Fj (λj (k)) = p
(2)
j (k) for all j ∈ [m], where Fj : R+ → R+ is the inverse demand curve for
j type of customer and p(2)j (k) is the price posted for j type of customer. We make the following
assumptions on the inverse demand curve which are standard in the economic literature.
Assumption 1. The inverse demand curve Fj (.) is strictly decreasing and twice continuously dif-
ferentiable for all j ∈ [m].
In words, if the posted price for customers is higher, then less customers would be willing to
avail that service and vice versa. In addition, we assume that the inverse demand curve is twice
continuously differentiable which is a technical assumption required for our analysis.
2
1
2
1
2
1
c11 = 0
c22 = 0
c12
c21
Customer
Compatible
Matchings
Server
Queue
Server
Type
Complete
Graph
nm n
cnn = 0
cn1
Fig. 2. A tripartite graph for two-sided queues with strategic servers.
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Assumption 2. The function λjFj (λj ) is concave for all j ∈ [m].
By the law of diminishing marginal utility, if the arrival rate increases, then the marginal utility
derived from each new customer ( d
dλj
λjF (λj )) decreases. This condition is equivalent to requiring
that the demand curve comes from a regular distribution.
Servers. Now, we define the arrival process of servers. We identify servers as decision makers
that make strategic joining decisions. A type i server arriving to the system can join the l type
queue for some l ∈ [m] or leave the system depending on its personal utility uil which, in turn,
depends on the price set by the system operator p(1) ∈ Rn
+
and the detour penalties c ∈ Rn×n . In
particular, a server of type i who joins the l type queue earns
uil = p
(1)
l
− cil ∀i ∈ [n], ∀l ∈ [n],
where p(1)
l
is the price set by the system operator for servers that join the l type queue, and cil
is the penalty due to lying incurred by a server of type i when she joins the l type server queue.
Our convention is to take cii = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. In our ridesharing application, cil represents a
detour cost experienced by a driver when she is assigned a non compatible trip. A type i driver
entering the system will compare her utilities uil ∀l ∈ [n]with her outside option. If the maximum
possible utility ui , maxl ∈[n]uil is greater than her outside option, then the driver will join the
queue which maximizes her utility. Otherwise, the driver will not join the system at all.
Formally, a server of type i who joins the system at time k uses the strategy ν i (k) ∈ [0, 1]n ,
where, for each l ∈ [n], νil (k) is the probability with which a type i server joins queue l . We say
that the strategy profile ν , (ν 1(k), . . . ,νn(k)) ∈ Rn×n+ is an equilibrium if and only if
νil (k) > 0 ⇒ uil (k) ≥ uil ′(k) ∀i, l
′ ∈ [n], and
n∑
l=1
νil (k) = 1,νil (k) ≥ 0 ∀i, l ∈ [n]. (EQ)
Given the definition above, we are ready to introduce the arrival processes of servers. Let µ¯(k) ∈ Rn
+
be the vector of arrival rates of servers to the system, where µ¯i (k) represents the arrival rate of
type i servers. LetGi : R+ → R denote the inverse supply curve for all i ∈ [n], then the arrival rate
of type i servers to the system satisfies Gi (µ¯i (k)) = ui (k). In turn, we define the effective arrival
process of servers to queue i as a sequence of independent random variables {a(1)i (k) : k ∈ Z+}
with mean E
[
a
(1)
i (k)
]
= µi (k) for all i ∈ [n], where µi (k) ,
∑n
l=1 µ¯l (k)νl i (k). Observe that because
a given queue may receive servers of different type, the arrival processes to different queues can be
correlated. We use Σ(1)(k) to denote the co-variance matrix of the arrival vector a(1)(k). We assume
that |a(1)i (k)| ≤ Amax with probability 1 for all i ∈ [n] and for all k ∈ Z+.
Policies. The system operator uses a stationary policy and makes both pricing and matching
decisions. We describe the pricing policy first. Given the state of the system (q ∈ Zn+m
+
), a station-
ary pricing policy is a vector (p(1)(q), p(2)(q)) ∈ Rn
+
× Rm
+
where p(1)i (q) is the payment to servers
in queue i ∈ [n], and p(2)j (q) is the price charged to customers in queue j ∈ [m]. In order to sim-
plify the analysis, we work in a general space of feasible rates instead of prices. For any stationary
rates, we identify a corresponding stationary pricing policy, hence, with some abuse of language,
we will refer to the stationary rates as stationary pricing policies. Note that, we are only interested
in stationary, Markovian, state dependent pricing policies and thus, we omit the dependence of λ
and µ on the time index k .
On the customer side, there is a one to one mapping between prices and the arrival rate of
customers to the customer queues. Hence, we define a customer stationary pricing policy by the
arrival rate vector λ(q) ∈ Rm
+
.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: August 2020.
Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Markets with Strategic Servers 7
On the server side, observe that we do not have a one-to-one correspondence between prices
and the arrival rate of servers to the server queues—for a given rate µ there could be many price
vectors that are consistent with µ. To address this, we define the set of prices that are consistent
with µ by
M(µ) ,
{
p(1) ∈ Rn
+
: ∃ν ∈ Rn×n
+
satisfying (EQ), Gi (µ¯i ) = ui , µi =
n∑
l=1
µ¯lνl i ∀i ∈ [n]
}
.
The setM(µ) is composed by those prices for which there exists an equilibrium that leads to the
arrival rates µ in the servers queues.We further defineΩ to be the set of rates µ such thatM(µ) , ∅.
In turn, for any state of the system q, we define a server stationary pricing policy as a probability
measure α(q) defined on the Borel sigma-algebra generated by Ω. That is, when the system state
is q, the arrival rate of servers into each queue is randomized over µ ∈ Ω with probability measure
α(q). We use PEQ to denote the set of such probability measures. The corresponding price p(1) is
then selected among the consistent prices so that it minimizes the cost
〈
µ, p(1)
〉
for the service
provider. The optimal cost function c : Ω → R+ is defined by
c(µ) , min
〈
µ, p(1)
〉
subject to p(1) ∈ M(µ). (1)
We make two important remarks about the server side policy. First, the reason we allow ran-
domized policies for servers is because they result in a richer class of pricing policies; but also
they enable us to tackle the inherent combinatorial structure and non convexity of the service
provider’s objective. The latter, materializes through the cost function c(·) and the strategic behav-
ior of servers.
Second, in this paper, we are interested in different types of equilibrium behavior depicting
different objectives, for example, servers do not lie (incentive compatible model) or the overall
profit of the system is maximized. Thus, to keep the model general enough, we will work with
a general cost function c(µ) throughout the paper and discuss the behaviour of each different
equilibria or objective by specializing the definition of c(µ) in later sections.
Now we specify the matching policy. We denote by {x˜(k) ∈ Zn×m
+
: k ∈ Z+} the decision
of matching customer-servers pairs at time k . Here, x˜i j (k) is the number of servers in the i type
queue that arematchedwith customers of type j at time k . For thematching decisions to be feasible,
the following conditions must be satisfied
x
(1)
i (k)
∆
=
m∑
j=1
x˜i j (k) ≤ q
(1)
i (k) + a
(1)
i (k) ∀i ∈ [n], (2a)
x
(2)
j (k)
∆
=
n∑
i=1
x˜i j (k) ≤ q
(2)
j (k) + a
(2)
j (k) ∀j ∈ [m], (2b)
x˜i j (k) = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, x˜i j (k) ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (2c)
where x(k) = (x(1)(k), x(2)(k)) for all k ∈ Z+ denote the total amount of servers and customers
matched in each queue at a given time period. The set of constraints (2) ensure that the number
of servers in the type i queue that are matched cannot be larger than the the total number of
servers in that queue plus the arrivals. Similarly, the number of customers in the type j queue that
are matched are at most equal to the total number of customers in that queue plus the arrivals.
Moreover, the only matches allowed are those given by the compatibility graphG(N1 ∪ N2, E). In
turn, given the state of the system after arrivals (q + a), a stationary matching policy is defined as
the decision of choosing x˜(q + a) or, equivalently, x(q + a) subject to (2).
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System dynamic. Given the pricing and matching policy, the system evolves as a discrete time
Markov chain. Thus, the time between two epochs is a given finite constant. The queue evolution
equation is given by:
q(k + 1) = q(k) + a(k) − x(k),
where x satisfies (2). We consider policies that render the system stable .
Definition 1 (Stability). The discrete time Markov chain is stable if under a given pricing and
matching policy, the communicating class containing the state 0n+m is positive recurrent and all
the other states (if any) are transient. We use E to denote the set of stationary Markovian pricing
and matching policies that make the system stable.
For a stable system, we denote the steady state parameters with a bar on top. In particular, q(k)
converges in distribution as k →∞ to a random vector denoted by q¯. The arrival rate vector given
the queue length q¯, is denoted by a¯ such that E [a¯] = (λ(q¯),Eα (q¯) [µ]) and the co-variance matrix
of a¯(2) is Σ(2)(q¯) and that of a¯(1) is Σ(1)(q¯). The matching decision given the queue length (q¯) and
arrival rate vector (a¯) is denoted by x¯.
Objective. Each customer entering the system pays the posted price and each server receives
the posted price. In addition, the system operator incurs a penalty s ≥ 0 due the waiting of cus-
tomers and servers. The objective of the system operator is to design the pricing and matching
policies such that the difference of average profit obtained and the average penalty incurred due
to waiting—the net average profit—is maximized. Mathematically,
R⋆ , sup
(λ(·),α (·),x(·))∈E
Eq¯
[
〈F (λ(q¯)),λ(q¯)〉 − Eα (q¯) [c(µ)] − s 〈1n+m, q¯〉
]
(3a)
subject to, λ(q) ∈ Rm
+
, ∀q ∈ S (3b)
α(q) ∈ PEQ, ∀q ∈ S (3c)
x(·) satisfies (2). (3d)
We will use π to refer to a policy (λ,α , x) and denote by R(π ) the expected net profit associated to
that policy. Moreover, P⋆ and P(π ) will denote the the optimal profit (when s = 0) and the profit
evaluated at π , respectively.
For a given pricing andmatching policy, computing the objective function of the above optimiza-
tion problem is itself challenging as the state space of the DTMC can be very large. In addition, the
optimization problem becomes a non-convex, integer optimization problem due to the equilibrium
constraints captured in PEQ.
Moreover, if the price of one type of the server is changed, it will lead to a change of arrival rates
of all types of servers. Due to this, the system operator will be required to adjust the customer
prices as well to compensate for the server arrival rates. This dependence of server arrival rates
and its influence on the customer arrival rates makes the analysis of the pricing policy non trivial.
To tackle these challenging problem, we start by introducing a novel probabilistic fluidmodel. In-
tuitively, we ignore the stochasticity of the systemwhichmakes the optimization problem tractable
and, in addition, we relax the stability constraint. In further sections, based on the solution to the
fluid model, we propose “near-optimal” pricing and matching policies.
3 A PROBABILISTIC FLUID MODEL
In this section, we will introduce a fluid counterpart of the optimization problem (3). A novel
feature in our fluid optimization problem is that, to determine the pricing policy, we must optimize
over the space of probability measures. We provide conditions under which this can be reduced
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to an optimization problem over the real space and also discuss the implications of the solution to
the optimal pricing policy.
3.1 Bounds and Structural Properties
Firstly, we present the probabilistic fluid optimization problem:
R˜⋆ , max
(λ˜, α˜, χ˜ ):α˜ ∈PEQ
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− Eα˜ [c(µ˜)] (4a)
subject to λ˜j =
n∑
i=1
χ˜i j ∀j ∈ [m] (4b)
Eα˜ [µ˜i ] =
m∑
j=1
χ˜i j ∀i ∈ [n] (4c)
χ˜i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χ˜i j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (4d)
where c(·) is the cost function given in (1), λ˜ is the ‘average’ flow of customers in the system, α˜
is the ‘average’ distribution governing the probabilistic server pricing policy and χ˜i j is the ‘aver-
age’ flow of i type of servers matched to j type of customer. The objective function is the profit
obtained by the system operator. Equations (4b), (4c) are flow conserving constraints and (4d) is
the compatibility constraint. The major distinction of our proposed fluid problem and others in
the literature is that we allow probabilistic pricing policies. This richer space of policies not only
obtains a larger profit with respect to the deterministic space of policies, but it also makes the
optimization problem more amenable to analysis by turning the objective function into a convex
function. Indeed, it is possible that the optimal cost function c(µ˜) is not a convex function of µ˜;
however, Eα˜ [µ˜] is linear in α˜ . In the next proposition, we leverage this fact to draw a connection
between the probabilistic fluid problem (4) and the stochastic problem (3).
Proposition 1. Let π = (λ(·),α(·), x(·)) be a feasible solution of (3) then
R(π ) ≤ P(π ) ≤ R˜⋆.
That is, the fluid profit is an upper bound for the stochastic profit and net profit.
Thus, this proposition provides us with an upper bound on the net average profit achievable
under any policy. Note that, if we naively try to use the optimal solution of the probabilistic fluid
model as the pricing policy for all q ∈ S , then in each time slot, we will receive fluid profit in
expectation. Although, the system becomes unstable as argued in [6] and thus, the stationary
distribution doesn’t exist. To see why the system is unstable, consider the case of single link two
sided queue operating under the pricing policy given by the fluid solution. It will just be a random
walk on Rwhich is known to be null recurrent. This provides us with the intuition that we need to
operate close to the fluid solution but we need to perturb the arrival rates for customers and/or the
probability measure for servers such that the system becomes stable.We now present the following
lemma which is a crucial step in the proof of the proposition.
Lemma 1. For a given stationary Markovian pricing and matching policy (λ(·),α(·), x(·)), let λ˜ =
E [λ(q¯)], α˜ = Eq¯ [α(q¯)] and χ˜ = E [x(q¯)]. Assume that E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] < ∞. If (λ(·),α(·), x(·)) ∈ E
and x(·) satisfies (2), then (λ˜, α˜ , χ˜ ) if feasible in the probabilistic fluid problem (4).
Intuitively, the above lemma is enforcing that the ’average’ arrival rates over the states must
be balanced, otherwise, in the long run, some of the queues will keep accumulating the arrivals
and that will lead to an unstable system. Thus, the constraints of the fluid model are necessary
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for stability. This implies that the set E is a subset of the feasible region of the fluid model. In
addition, as the objective (3a) is convex in its parameters, we can use Jensen’s inequality to obtain
the objective of the fluid solution. These two key steps together will give us Proposition 1.
Next, we identify a condition for the optimal cost function c(·) such that the optimal value of
the probabilistic fluid optimization problem (4) coincides with that of a non-probabilistic fluid
problem. Moreover, we establish that, under this condition, the optimal fluid server pricing policy
is a Dirac probability measure. Intuitively, if the optimal cost function is not convex then, under
a probabilistic policy α˜ , Jensen’s inequality might be violated, that is, Eα˜ [c(µ˜)] < c(Eα˜ [µ˜]). This
will lead to lower cost under the probabilistic policy compared to the corresponding deterministic
policy, Eα˜ [µ˜]. In turn, when the optimal cost function is convex, we expect that a deterministic
server pricing policy will be optimal. In particular, we establish that the probabilistic fluid model
can be reduced to the following optimization problem over the real vector space.
R˜⋆co , max
(λ˜, µ˜, χ˜ ):µ˜ ∈Ω
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− c(µ˜) (5a)
subject to, λ˜j =
n∑
i=1
χ˜i j ∀j ∈ [m], µ˜i =
m∑
j=1
χ˜i j ∀i ∈ [n] χ˜i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χ˜i j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (5b)
Proposition 2. If c(·) is convex, then R˜⋆ = R˜⋆co and there exists an optimal solution of (4)
(λ˜
⋆
, α˜⋆, χ˜⋆) such that α˜⋆ is a Dirac probability measure.
The proof follows by using Jensen’s inequality in the objective function of (4) and then redefin-
ing Eα˜ [µ˜]. This proposition simplifies the fluidmodel and also provides sufficient conditions under
which the optimal fluid pricing policy is deterministic. The proof of the proposition is deferred to
the appendix.
In the next sections, we will consider pricing policies which are are a small perturbation of the
fluid solution and show that the net profit and profit under that policy is ‘sufficiently’ close to
R˜⋆. Before that, we expound on the cost function c(·) and the equilibrium condition (EQ) which
will provide further insights on the server pricing policy which, in turn, will further impact the
customer pricing policy.
3.2 Cost Function Reformulation
The results in this subsection are for the specific cost function defined in (1). Although, the results
in the rest of the paper, in particular the fluid and stochastic analysis are valid for any cost func-
tion. We begin by reformulating the constraint (EQ) as a variational inequality. This will allow us
to apply KKT conditions on the optimization problem that defines the optimal cost function to
equivalently reformulate it as standard inequality and equality constraints optimization problem
as done in [17]. The lemma is presented below.
Lemma 2. Let C = {ν ∈ Rn×n
+
:
∑n
l=1 νil = 1 ∀i ∈ [n]} and let ν ∈ C, the following are equivalent:
(1) ν satisfies (EQ).
(2) ν satisfies
∑n
i=1
∑n
l=1uil (νil − ν˜il ) ≥ 0 for all ν˜ ∈ C.
(3) There exists κ ∈ Rn and ξ ∈ Rn×n
+
such that uil = κi − ξil and ξilνik = 0 for all i, l ∈ [n].
Recall from the definition ofM(µ), besides the equilibrium constraint, according to the defini-
tion of the optimal cost function in (1), we must enforce the following relation between the total
rate of i type of server joining the system and their maximum utility with µ¯ik
∆
= µ¯iνik ,
Gi
(
n∑
k=1
µ¯ik
)
= max
l ∈[n]
{uil }, ∀i ∈ [n]. (6)
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We can write the constraint (6) in terms of standard inequality constraints and binary variables
b ∈ {0, 1}n×n by using the following lemma.
Lemma 3. There exists anM > 0 such that the following constraints are equivalent:
(1) Gi
(∑n
k=1 µ¯ik
)
= maxl ∈[n]{uil } for all i ∈ [n].
(2) Gi
(∑n
k=1 µ¯ik
)
≥ uil , Gi
(∑n
k=1 µ¯ik
)
≤ uil + (1 − bil )M , bil ∈ {0, 1} for all i, l ∈ [n] and∑n
l=1 bil = 1 for all i ∈ [n].
The first inequality in 2 enforcesGi (.) to be greater than each of theuil and the second inequality
along with the constraint
∑n
l=1 bil enforces Gi (.) to be less than or equal to the maximum of uil .
In addition, we can take M =
∑n
i=1 (Gi (〈1n, µ〉)). Thus, by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we obtain a
reformulation of c(·) as a value function of a mixed-integer non linear program. If the inverse
supply curve is a linear function, then it becomes a mixed-integer linear program.
4 ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY OF TWO PRICE POLICY
In this section, we will analyze the stochastic system and show that the net profit obtained is
‘sufficiently’ close to the upper bound R˜⋆. To show this, we will consider the large market asymp-
totic regime indexed by η. In this regime, we propose a dynamic two-price policy and show that
its corresponding net profit converges to that of the scaled optimal fluid solution. We define our
asymptotic regime below.
Definition 2 (Asymptotic Regime). We study the system in the large market regime, wherein for
the ηth system, the time between two decision epochs is scaled by 1/η and the arrivals between
two decision epochs remains the same in the stochastic sense.
Our convention is to subscript by η all the parameters which are associated with the ηth system.
For example, the steady state queue length vector is denoted as q¯η and the corresponding arrival
and matching random variables by a¯η and x¯η respectively. The time scaling leads to a large volume
of arrivals per unit time and more frequent matching decisions. This is desirable as the inflow of
customers and servers are increasing, it is advantageous to make the matching decision more
frequently.
Note that, under the asymptotic regime, the optimal fluid solution will be R˜⋆η = ηR˜
⋆. This is
because the time is scaled by η which leads to the profit per unit time to be scaled by η. Now,
motivated by Proposition 1, we will define ‘net profit-loss’, a metric to analyze various policies.
Definition 3 (Net Profit-Loss). For a given pricing and matching policy πη , the net profit-loss,
Lη(πη ), for the η
th system is defined as the difference of the optimal profit R⋆η and the long run
average net profit obtained under that policy
Lη (πη) , R
⋆
η − Rη (πη).
In addition, we define the profit-loss as LPη (πη) , R
⋆
η − Pη (πη ).
We say that a sequence of policies {πη } is optimal if
lim sup
η→∞
Lη(πη )
η
= 0. (7)
Thus, any policy which leads to o(η) net profit-loss is optimal.
Now that we have defined a criterion to analyze a given policy, we introduce a sequence of
policies which are asymptotically optimal. The idea is to design a policy that operates as close to
the fluid solution as possible because that will result in fluid optimal profit. Denote the optimal
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solution of the probabilistic fluid problem as (λ˜
⋆
, α˜⋆, χ˜⋆). Note that, without loss of generality,
we can assume λ˜
⋆
> 0m , Eα˜⋆ [µ] > 0n and χ˜
⋆
i j > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E, otherwise, we can remove
that vertex/edge from the graph and work with a smaller graph such that the above conditions are
satisfied. Now, we introduce the two price policy:
λη, j(q) =
{
λ˜⋆j + ϵη if q
(2)
j = 0;
λ˜⋆j − ϵη otherwise;
αη (q) = α˜
⋆
, ∀q ∈ S . (8)
We assume that ϵη → 0 as η →∞ as we want to approach the fluid optimal pricing policy.Without
loss of generality, we can assume ϵη ≤ 1 for all η. We highlight the simplicity of this pricing policy
in which we use two different rates only on the customer side and on the server side, we use a
fixed probabilistic policy. In addition, the threshold at which we change the rate is at q
(2)
j = 0. This
captures how the service provider needs to adjust its pricing policy to maintain a stable system
and, in turn, sustain the proper balance of supply and demand.
The matching policy we use is the max-weight matching policy which is defined as:
x˜η (k) = arg max
y∈Z
|E |
+
∑
(i, j)∈E
yi j (q
(1)
η,i (k) + q
(2)
η, j (k)) subject to (2). (9)
Note that y can be relaxed to be a continuous variable due to the following: the constraint set we
have is a polyhedron of the form {Ay ≤ b} where b ∈ Zn+m
+
and A ∈ {0, 1}(m+n)×mn . Note that A
is the incidence matrix of the bipartite graphG(N1 ∪ N2, E) and thus, the polyhedron is integral.
We use πη to refer to the policy defined in (8) and (9). Now, we will present the main theorem
of this paper.
Theorem 4. Consider a sequence of DTMCs parametrized by η operating under the pricing and
matching policy πη . Then the net profit-loss Lη(πη ) is O(η
1/3) for the choice ϵη = η−1/3.
The main reason we obtain an η1/3 net profit loss is due to the trade off between the expected
queue length and profit-loss. Consider a pricing policy which deviates from the fluid optimal pric-
ing policy by at-most ϵ , that is, for all q ∈ S , we have |λj (q) − λ˜
⋆
j | ≤ ϵ for all j ∈ [m] and
|Eα (q) [µi ] − Eα˜⋆ [µi ] | ≤ ϵ for all i ∈ [n]. Then, the expected queue length is of the order
1
ϵ and
profit loss is of the order ϵ2. Considering the trade off between expected queue length and profit
loss, the best ϵ is η−1/3 which results in η1/3 net profit loss. In particular, the expected queue length
is of the order 1/ϵ as ϵ characterizes the drift of the DTMC towards zero and that is analogous
to the traffic intensity in a single sided queue. It is well known that expected queue length scales
as 1/ϵ for a single sided queue operating in heavy traffic (ϵ → 0). In addition, the expression of
profit-loss can be expanded using Taylor’s series expansion. The first order term can be shown to
be zero by using the optimality of (λ˜
⋆
, α˜⋆). The second order term results in order ϵ2 loss.
Proof sketch. There are two major steps in proving this theorem. First, we need to bound the
expected sum of queue lengths under the given policy and second, we need to bound the loss in
average profit (R∗η−Pη ). Both the steps require special treatment because of the strategic behaviour
of the servers. In addition, analyzing the queueing system is more complicated than [26] as the
arrival process is general. Here, we present multiple lemmas which assists us in proving the theo-
rem and outline the major steps in the proof. Firstly, under the given pricing and matching policy,
we show that the system is stable and we upper bound the expected sum of queue lengths.
Lemma 4. There exists an η0 > 0 such that for all η > η0, the discrete time Markov chain operating
under the pricing and matching policy πη is positive recurrent and there exists a constant B > 0 such
that E
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
≤ B 1
ϵη
.
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We use the Foster-Lyapunov theorem [24, Theorem 3.3.7] to prove positive recurrence. In partic-
ular, we considered a quadratic Lyapunov function and analyzed its drift. Thenwe use the moment
bound theorem [10] to get bounds on the sum of expected queue lengths. Due to the strategic be-
haviors of the servers, the arrivals to different queues are co-related and the co-variance of the
arrival process appears in the constant B1.
After we proved that the system is positive recurrent, by Lemma 1, we know that the arrival rates
under the two price policy satisfy the constraints of the fluid optimization problem (4). We will
use this idea to show the following equality which, in turn, will be useful to obtain the profit-loss
bound.
Lemma 5. For all η > 0, the DTMC operating under the pricing and matching policy πη , such that
E
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
< ∞ the following holds:
m∑
j=1
(
λ⋆j F
′(λ⋆j ) + Fj (λ
⋆
j )
) (
P
[
q
η(2)
j > 0
]
− P
[
q
η(2)
j = 0
])
= 0.
In this Lemma, we use the fact that (λ˜
⋆
, α˜⋆, χ˜⋆) is the optimal solution of the probabilistic fluid
model. Although, we cannot apply the KKT conditions directly as the optimization is over infinite
dimensional vector space. Thus, we first construct a finite dimensional optimization problem by
eliminating the probability measure α˜ from the fluid optimization problem (4). We are able to
eliminate the probability measure by adding the constraint α˜ = α˜⋆ to the probabilistic fluid model.
To apply KKT conditions, we find a feasible direction at the optimal point. A feasible point of
the optimization problem is the ‘average’ arrival rates of the two price policy (8) as the DTMC is
stable under two price policy and E is a subset of the feasible region of the fluid model.
Now, we use the above lemma to find the profit loss LPη .
Lemma 6. For all η > 0, the profit loss of the DTMC operating under the pricing and matching
policy πη is
LPη
η
= −ϵ2η
m∑
j=1
(
λ⋆j F
′′(λ⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ
⋆
j )
)
+O
(
ϵ2η
)
where,
m∑
j=1
(
λ⋆j F
′′(λ⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ
⋆
j )
)
< 0.
We use Assumption 1 and Taylor’s series expansion up to second order of the demand curve
Fj (.) for all j ∈ [m]. We then apply Lemma 5 to eliminate the first order term of the expansion
which, in turn, delivers the desired result.
5 LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we will make the intuition provided for η1/3 rigours by showing that, under a
broad class of policies, this is the best possible trade off between expected queue length and profit
loss. We first establish that the expected queue length is bounded by a term of order 1ϵ . Then, we
consider a broad class of policies and show that the profit loss is exactly of order ηϵ2. In turn, by
choosing ϵ = 1/η1/3, we deduce that the profit loss is of order η1/3.
For the reminder of this section, we make the following mild additional assumptions on the
arrival process. For a given j , if we have λj (k) ≥ λj (k
′) for some k,k ′ ∈ Z+, we assume that
a
(2)
j (k) ≥s .t . a
(2)
j (k
′). This assumption, in the economic context, translates to rationality of cus-
tomers, i.e. if the system operator offers the same service for a lower price, the customer ar-
rival rate can only increase. Similarly, for servers, if Eα (k) [µi ] ≥ Eα (k′) [µi ], we assume that
a
(1)
i (k) ≥s .t . a
(1)
i (k
′).
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Fig. 3. Single link two sided queue with Bernoulli arrivals
5.1 Expected sum of queue length
Consider a single link two sided queue (q(1),q(2))with Bernoulli arrivals, that isa(1)(q) ∼ Bernoulli(Eα (q) [µ])
and a(2)(q) ∼ Bernoulli(λ(q)). Note that for the case of single link two sided queue, there is no self-
ish behaviour of servers as there is only a single type of server. Now, let us analyze the imbalance
given by z(k) = q(1)(k)−q(2)(k). Note that, as there is no incentive to keep the customers or servers
waiting in the system, we will immediately match any pair of customer-server waiting in the sys-
tem. Thus, q(1)(k)q(2)(k) = 0 for all k ∈ Z+ with probability 1. So, z completely describes the state
of the system and so, z is a Markov chain. In fact, it is a birth and death process as shown in Figure
3 where lz = λ(z)(1 − Eα (z) [µ]),mz = Eα (z) [µ] (1 − λ(z)) and pz = 1 − lz −mz for all z ∈ Z. Now,
consider a general pricing policy such that we are at most ϵ away from the optimal fluid solution,
that is, for all z ∈ S , we have |λ(z) − λ⋆ | ≤ ϵ for all j ∈ [m] and |Eα (z) [µ] − Eα⋆ [µ] | ≤ ϵ for all
i ∈ [n]. Thus,
|lz − λ˜
⋆(1 − Eα˜⋆ [µ])| ≤ ϵ − ϵ
2
, lmin ≥ (λ˜
⋆ − ϵ)(1 − Eα˜⋆ [µ] − ϵ),
|mz − Eα˜⋆ [µ] (1 − λ˜
⋆)| ≤ ϵ − ϵ2, mmax ≤ (Eα˜⋆ [µ] + ϵ)(1 − λ˜
⋆
+ ϵ).
We can couple this birth and death process with anM/M/1 queue, q†, with Bernoulli(λ⋆−ϵ) arrival
and Bernoulli(Eα˜⋆ [µ] + ϵ) service. The coupling is such that q
†(k) ≤ |z(k)| for all k ∈ Z+ with
probability 1. By Kingman’s bound, we know that E
[
q¯†
]
∼ 1ϵ . Thus, by the above defined coupling,
E [|z¯ |] is at least 1
ϵ
. In short, if we perturb the arrival rates of a two sided queue by at most ϵ then
it behaves like a single server queue in heavy traffic.
In the next theorem, we exploit the intuition for the single link case to show a related lower
bound for the more general system of multiple link two sided queue with arbitrary arrival process.
Theorem 5. Consider a DTMC operating under any matching policy and pricing policy such that
for all q ∈ S , we have |λj (q) − λ˜
⋆
j | ≤ ϵ for all j ∈ [m] and |Eα (q) [µi ] − Eα˜⋆ [µi ] | ≤ ϵ for all i ∈ [n],
then there exists ϵ0 > 0 such that for all ϵ < ϵ0
E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] ≥
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}ϵ
.
5.2 (Net) Profit-Loss
In this section, we will restrict ourselves to a broad class of pricing policies and show that the
profit-loss is R∗η −Pη ∼ ηϵ
2. We fix the server pricing policy to the optimal fluid pricing policy and
consider a broad class of pricing policies for customers. In particular, we consider the following:
λj,η (q) = λ˜
⋆
j + ϕ j
(
q
ηα
)
ηβ , ∀q ∈ S,η > 0, j ∈ [m].
The first component is the optimal fluid rate and the second component is a queue length depen-
dent adjustment (c.f., [14, 26]). The adjustment is decomposed into a scaled queue length dependent
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adjustment ϕ j (·) and a factor that depends on the scaling parameter η. We take β < 0 as we want
to approach the optimal fluid solution as η → ∞. We impose some technical conditions on the
functions ϕ j (·) for all j ∈ [m].
Assumption 3. For all j ∈ [m], ϕ j (·) satisfies the following.
(a) There exists M j < ∞ such that supq∈S
(
ϕ j (q)
)
≤ M j for j ∈ [m].
(b) We have α + β ≤ 0.
(c) There exists K > 0 and σ > 0 such that for all j ∈ [m], if q(2)j /η
α
> K or there exists an i such
that (i, j) ∈ E and q
(1)
i /η
α
> K , then
ϕ j ( qηα )  > σ .
These conditions are identical to the conditions given in [26]. Condition (a) is a technical as-
sumption which is required for our analysis. Condition (b) states that the scaling of the system
state should be less than the scaling of the pricing policy converging to the fluid optimal. Con-
dition (c) establishes the intuitive condition that as the queue length of a customer (or any of
its compatible counterparts) is very large, the system operator should decrease (or increase) the
arrival rate of the customer. We now present the lower bound on profit-loss.
Theorem 6. Consider a sequence of DTMCs parametrized by η operating under any pricing policy
satisfying 3 and any matching policy. There exists a constant K > 0, that depends on (ϕ j )j∈[m], F and
c , and η1 > 0 such that for all η > η1 we have R∗η − Pη ≥ Kη
2β+1
.
The proof involves using Taylor’s Theorem to expand the profit-loss and then using Lemma 8
to drop the first order term. The proof is concluded by showing that the coefficient of the second
order term is non zero. Now, from Theorem 5 we have E [q¯] ≥ 1/ηβ . In turn, from Theorem 6, we
deduce R∗η − Pη ≥ Kη
2β+1. To make the best use of the trade off, we should pick β = −1/3 which
will give us η1/3 net profit-loss. This shows that there exists a broad class of policies under which
the upper bound given by Theorem 4 is tight. We present the result formally in the following
corollary.
Corollary 7. Under the hypothesis of Theorem 6, there exists a constant K ′, that depends on
(ϕ j )j∈[m], F and c , and η2 > 0 such that for all η > η2, we have Lη ≥ K
′η1/3
Proof. For the sequence of DTMCs parametrized by η, by using Theorem 5 with ϵ(η) = Mηβ
we have
E
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
≥
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}Mηβ
.
Now, the net profit-loss is given by
Lη = R
∗
η − Pη − sE
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
≥ Kη2β+1 +
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}Mηβ
∀η > η1
≥ inf
β<0
{
Kη2β+1 +
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}Mηβ
}
= K ′η1/3.

6 A QUALITY DRIVEN VIEW OF THE NEAR OPTIMAL POLICY
We present an alternate view of the sequence of policies we considered in the previous sections.
In particular, instead of considering an asymptotic regime, we analyze the system under a near
optimal policy and, critically, impose a given service quality.
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To gain intuition, let us consider the two price policy given by (8) and (9). From Lemma 4 and
Lemma 6, we know that E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] ∼
1
ϵ
and R∗ − P ∼ ϵ
2 with ϵη = ϵ . Now, for the profit to
approach the fluid solution, we need to let ϵ → 0. However, this causes the expected sum of queue
length to go to infinity and, therefore, there could be an arbitrary large loss of service quality
impacting both servers and customers.
In this section, we maximize the profit (or equivalently, minimize the profit-loss) given a target
service level of the system. Specifically, we consider the additional constraint that E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] =
C for some constant C > 0. In this case, we need to pick ϵ to be of the order 1
C
. This will lead to
an O( 1
C 2
) profit-loss as R∗ − P ∼ ϵ
2. If C is large, then the system is allowed to keep customers
and servers waiting for a longer period of time. This allows the system operator to use the policy
which is closer to the fluid optimal policy and thus, the profit-loss is lower; but, at the same time,
the service quality is hurt. We make this discussion rigorous in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Consider a DTMC operating under the pricing and matching policy given by (8) (9)
and ϵ = ϵη is such that E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] = C , then
R∗ −
B3
C2
+O
(
1
C2
)
≤ R ≤ R∗ −
B4
C2
+O
(
1
C2
)
,
where B3 = −
m∑
j=1
(
λ⋆j F
′′(λ⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ
⋆
j )
) ©­­«
B1 + 2B2
2mini ∈[n]
{∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ⋆j
} ª®®¬
2
> 0,
and B4 = −
m∑
j=1
(
λ⋆j F
′′(λ⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ
⋆
j )
) (
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}
)2
> 0.
This follows directly from Lemma 4, Theorem 5 and Lemma 6 with ϵη = ϵ
′. We note that, this
result provides bounds on the profit given the expected queue length and it is free of any scal-
ing. Which means, we are able to analyze the original system without relying on any asymptotic
regime.
7 VARIATIONS OF COST FUNCTION AND SIMULATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by considering four different vari-
ations of the cost function. Each variation corresponds to a different model of strategic behavior
we impose on servers. We use numerical simulation to compare the different models. We begin by
stating the variations of c(·).
Selfish Servers (SD): This corresponds to the cost function defined in Section 2 and given by
(1). We denote the optimal objective value of (4) by R0∗ and the optimal solution with (∗, 0) as the
super-script.
Incentive Compatible (IC): In this model we enforce the constraint that servers do not lie.
This is equivalent to designing an incentive compatible pricing policy. That is, we ensure that
uii ≥ uil for all l ∈ [n], for all i ∈ [n]. We make an additional assumption that a server will choose
its own queue if possible. Thus, we will have µ¯il = 0 for all l , i . The cost function with this new
constraint can be re written as follows:
c(µ) = min
p(1)
〈
µ, p(1)
〉
subject to, uil = p
(1)
l
− cil ∀i ∈ [n], ∀l ∈ [n], Gi (µi ) = uii ∀i ∈ [n], uii ≥ uil ∀i ∈ [n] ∀l ∈ [n].
By noting that cii = 0 for all i ∈ [n] and eliminating u and p(1), we get
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c(µ) =
{∑n
i=1Gi (µi )µi if Gi (µi ) ≥ Gl (µl ) − cil , ∀i ∈ [n], ∀l ∈ [n],
∞ otherwise.
(10)
Now, if Gi (·) is an affine function, then c(·) is convex so we can reduce (4) to the LP (5).
Corollary 9. If Gi (·) is an affine, monotonically increasing function for all i ∈ [n], then c(·) is
convex. Thus, by Proposition 2, we have R∗ = R
∗
c .
Proof. We know thatGi (µi ) = biµi +b
′
i such that bi ≥ 0. Thus, 〈G(µ), µ〉 is a quadratic function
in µ with a positive semi-definite hessian. Thus, it is convex. In addition, the domain of c(·) is a
polyhedron as it is defined by a finite number of affine inequalities, thus it is convex. 
The cost function in this variation is given by (10). We denote the optimal objective value of (4)
by R1∗ and the optimal solution with (∗, 1) as the super-script.
β− Incentive Compatible (β− IC): In this model we consider a convex combination of the
two cases we considered before. That is, we enforce that at least 0 < β < 1 fraction of each type
of servers are truthful, that is, they join their own queue. Thus, we add an additional constraint
νii ≥ β for all i ∈ [n] or equivalently, µ¯ii ≥ β
∑n
l=1 µ¯il for all i ∈ [n]. For β = 0, it is equivalent
to the first case (SD) and for β = 1, it is equivalent to the second case (IC). The cost function is
given by (1) with an additional constraint µ¯ii ≥ β
∑n
l=1 µ¯il for all i ∈ [n]. We denote the optimal
objective value of (4) by R
β
∗ and the optimal solution with (∗, β) as the super-script.
First Best, Incentive Compatible (FB-IC): In this case, all the servers join their own queue
irrespective of their utilities. The fluid model is given by [26]. We denote its optimal objective
value by R1∗∗ and the optimal solution with super-script (∗∗, 1).
We first present some straight forward relations between the optimal values of (4).
Proposition 3. The following statements are true:
(1) R1∗∗ ≥ R
1
∗ and if cil ≥ Gl (µ
∗∗,1
l
) −Gi (µ
∗∗,1
i ) for all i, l ∈ [n], then R
1
∗∗ = R
1
∗ .
(2) R
β1
∗ ≥ R
β2
∗ for all 1 ≥ β2 ≥ β1 ≥ 0.
(3) For c1 ≥ c2, we have R
1
∗(c1) ≤ R
1
∗(c2).
It is obvious that (2) is true as the feasible region of the optimization problem defining the cost
function for β1-IC servers contains the feasible region of β2-IC servers and their objective functions
are identical. In addition, (1) follows by noting that the domain of c1∗ is a subset of the domain of
c1∗∗ and they are equal in the domain of c
1
∗ .
Now, to solve these fluid models numerically, we present an equivalent reformulation of the
probabilistic fluid model as a finite dimensional optimization problem. We first identify that the
primal problem (4) is a class of risk averse optimization problem and falls into the category of the
problem of moments (Section 6.6, [23]). Thus, by [23, Proposition 6.40 ], we can rewrite the primal
equivalently as follows:
max
λ, {µl }n+1
l=1
, χ ,β
〈F (λ),λ〉 −
n+1∑
l=1
c(µl )βl
subject to, λj =
n∑
j=1
χi j ∀j ∈ [m],
n+1∑
l=1
βl µ
l
i =
m∑
j=1
χi j ∀i ∈ [n]
χi j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χi j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E, 〈1n+1, β〉 = 1, β ≥ 0n+1.
It is a finite optimization problem with dimension of the decision variables equal to 2m+n2+3n+1.
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Fig. 4. Contour plot of cost function c(.) for SD, 0.5-IC, IC and FB: IC with c12 = 2, c21 = 5.
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Fig. 5. N-Network.
7.1 N-Network
We compare the cost functions and the resultant fluid model for the different cases discussed above.
In this sub section, we consider an N-network graph and carry out simulations by varying the
inverse supply curves and the penalty due to lying. We start by plotting the contour plots of the
cost functions with the penalty c12 = 2 and c21 = 5 for all the different cases and for two sets of
supply curves. The results are summarized in Fig. 4. It can be observed that for the case of IC and
FB: IC, the cost function is convex and for all the other cases, it is non convex. Although, for some
choices of supply curves, the cost function is close to convex as in Fig. 4 (e), (f).Wewill later see that
the optimal pricing policy for convex and near convex cost functions is deterministic and for non-
convex cost functions, it is probabilistic. We pick linear demand curves given by F1(λ1) = 10−λ1/2
and F2 = 15 − λ2. The resultant optimal objective values of (4) is summarized in Table 1. The
optimal solution in the case of incentive compatible servers for all the cases is a deterministic
Supply Curve G1 = 2µ1, G2 = µ2 G1 = µ1, G2 = 3µ2 − 3
(c12, c21) (0, 0) (2, 5) (20, 50) (0, 0) (2, 5) (20, 50)
R0∗ 38.19 38.19 38.19 39.75 37.37 36.91
R1∗ 38.19 38.19 38.19 36.86 36.91 36.91
R1∗∗ 38.19 38.19 38.19 36.91 36.91 36.91
Table 1. Comparison of optimal value of different fluid models.
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pricing policy for the servers as the supply curves are chosen to be linear and thus, the simulation
results conform with Corollary 9. In addition, as expected, we have R1∗ ≤ R
1
∗∗. For the first set of
supply curves, by statement one of Proposition 3, for all c12, c21 ≥ 0, we have R1∗ = R
1
∗∗ and for the
second set of supply curves, for all c12 ≥ 0.42 and c21 ≥ −0.42, we have R1∗ = R
1
∗∗. In words, if c
is large enough, the system operator doesn’t need to incentivize the servers and this threshold of
penalty depends on the network topology, supply and demand curves.
The optimal solution in the case of selfish servers for the first and second set of supply curves
is a deterministic and probabilistic policy, respectively. By the contour plots of the cost function
given in Fig. 4 (a), (d), we can see that in the first case, it is approximately convex and in the second
case, it is non convex. This verifies Proposition 2. The optimal solution withG1 = µ1,G2 = 3µ2 − 3,
and c = 02×2 are as follows:
(µ¯1)0,∗ =
[
3.42 2.18
0.12 0
]
(µ¯2)0,∗ =
[
0 0.21
3.53 1.97
]
(µ¯3)0,∗ =
[
0.025 2.18
3.52 0
]
β0,∗ = (0.15, 0.31, 0.54)
λ0,∗ = (2.15, 3.58)
(µ¯1)1,∗ =
[
3.42 0
0 2.14
]
β1,∗ = (1, 0, 0)
λ1,∗ = (3.42, 2.14)
(µ¯1)1,∗∗ =
[
3.33 0
0 2.25
]
β1,∗∗ = (1, 0, 0)
λ1,∗∗ = (3.33, 2.25)
One crucial observation is that the optimal solution of IC and FB: IC are close to each other even
when c is small. In the next sub-section, we analyze this further.
7.2 A Generic City Model
2 (E)
1 (N)
3 (W)
4 (S)
2
1
3
4
5
2 (N,W)
3 (S,E)
4 (S,W)
5 (N,E,W,S)
1 (N,E)
Customer
Compatible
Matchings
Server
Queue
Server
Type
Complete
Graph
Fig. 6. A Generic City Model.
c =

0 2 2 10 5
2 0 10 2 5
2 10 0 2 5
10 2 2 0 5
0 0 0 0 0

× c¯
Motivated by our ridesharing example, we simulate the network given by Fig. 6 with linear
supply and demand curves. In particular, the demand curves are F1(λ1) = 10 − λ1/2, F2(λ2) =
12 − λ3/2, F3(λ3) = 12 − λ3/2, F4(λ4) = 18 − λ4 and the supply curves are G1(µ1) = 3µ1 − 3,
G2(µ2) = 2µ2, G3(µ3) = µ3), G4(µ4) = 2.5µ4 and G5(µ5) = µ5. Each type of customer is described
by the destination they wish to go and each type of server is described the list of destinations or a
single destination they wish to go. The compatibility between a pair of customer and server holds
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Fig. 9. Optimal objective value of
IC vs first best: IC vs penalty due
to lying
if they wish to go to the same destination. The penalty due to waiting (c) is given in Fig. 6 and is
parametrized by a scalar c¯ . For a given (i, l) pair, cil is high if the destinations are in the opposite
directions and lower otherwise. For example, c14 is high as the choices of destination of type 1
server does not match at all with type 2 server. Now, we compare the solution of the fluid model
for IC and FB:IC for different values of c. The result is plotted in Fig. 9. We can observe that the
two optimal solutions are not too different from each other. In addition, we parametrize the supply
curveG5 = i ×
µ5
10 and analyze the fluid solution of FB: IC as i varies. The results are plotted in Fig.
7 and Fig. 8.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a very general model of two-sided queues with strategic servers. The
cost paid to the servers as a function of their arrival rates is formulated as an optimization problem
with equilibrium constraints. We consider multiple different models and present their comparison
using theoretical and simulation results. Using a general cost function, we introduced a novel
probabilistic fluid model which provides an upper bound on the achievable profit under any policy.
Then, we presented a two price policy and max-weight matching policy which achieves this upper
bound under the large market regime withO(η1/3) rate of convergence.We also showed that under
a broad class of customer pricing policy, the rate of convergence is lower bounded byΩ(η1/3) under
any matching policy. Finally, given the service level of the system, we presented the bounds on
the achievable profit under the two price policy and max-weight matching policy which is an
asymptotic regime free result.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: August 2020.
Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Markets with Strategic Servers 21
A PROBABILISTIC FLUID MODEL
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. In this proof, we denote α(q¯) as α(q¯, µ) to be explicit that for all q¯ ∈ S , α(q¯, µ) is a prob-
ability measure over µ ∈ Ω. As the DTMC is assumed to be stable, there exists a unique stationary
distribution and we denote it by π . By the hypothesis of the Lemma, we have Eq¯ [〈1n+m, q¯〉] < ∞.
Thus, in steady state, we have E [q¯] = E [q¯+] ⇒ E [a¯] = E [x¯], where we denote the queue length
one time slot after q¯ by q¯+ = q¯ + a¯ − x¯. Now, we will simplify the RHS and LHS separately. We
have
E [a¯] = E [E [a¯|q¯]] = E
[ (
λ(q¯),Eα (q¯) [µ]
) ]
=
(
E [λ(q¯)] ,E
[
Eα (q¯) [µ]
] ) ∗
=
(
λ˜,Eα˜ [µ]
)
, (11)
where (∗) follows as λ˜j = E
[
λj
]
for all j ∈ [m] and
E
[
Eα (q¯) [µi ]
]
=
∑¯
q∈S
∫
Ω
µi dα(q¯, µ) π (q¯)
∗
=
∫
Ω
µi
∑¯
q∈S
dα(q¯, µ) π (q¯)
∗∗
=
∫
Ω
µi dα˜(µ) = Eα˜ [µi ] ,
where, (∗) follows from Tonelli’s Theorem and (∗∗) follows as we defined
∑
q¯∈S α(q¯, µ) π (q¯) = α˜ (µ)
and observe that α˜ (.) is a probability measure as it is non negative,
∫
Ω
dα˜(µi ) = 1 and it is countably
additive Now, we will simplify the right hand side. First define E
[
x˜i j (q¯)
]
= χ˜i j for all (i, j). By (2)(c),
we have χ˜i j = 0 for all (i, j) < E. Next, we have
E
[
x
(1)
i (q¯)
]
=
m∑
j=1
E
[
x˜i j (q¯)
]
=
m∑
j=1
χ˜i j ∀i ∈ [n], E
[
x
(2)
j (q¯)
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
x˜i j (q¯)
]
=
n∑
i=1
χ˜i j ∀j ∈ [m].
(12)
Now, simplifying E [a¯] = E [x¯] using (11) and (12), we get the constraints of the optimization
problem (4). 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We will first show that R∗co ≥ R
∗. For a given α˜ , let us start by defining µ
∆
= Eα˜ [µ˜]. Now,
the objective function of (4) can be upper bounded by Jensen’s inequality to get〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− Eα˜ [c(µ˜)] ≤
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− c (Eα˜ [µ˜]) =
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− c(µ).
Thus, we have
R∗ ≤ max
λ˜, α˜, χ˜
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− c(µ)
subject to, λ˜j =
n∑
i=1
χ˜i j ∀j ∈ [m]
µi =
m∑
j=1
χ˜i j ∀i ∈ [n]
χ˜i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χ˜i j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E,
Note that we can replace α˜ by µ in the arguments in terms of which we are maximizing as the
objective function and constraints only depend on α˜ through µ. Thus, by (5), we get R∗ ≤ R∗co .
Now, we will show the opposite inequality. Let the optimal solution of (5) be (λ˜
⋆
, µ⋆, χ˜⋆). Note
that (λ˜
⋆
, α˜⋆, χ˜⋆) is a feasible solution for (4), with α˜⋆ = 1 if µ˜ = µ⋆ and 0 otherwise. Under this
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feasible solution, the objective function value of (4) is R∗co . Thus, we have R
∗ ≥ R∗co . This completes
the proof.

A.3 Cost Function Reformulation
Proof of Lemma 2. We will first show that 2 ⇒ 1.
n∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
uilνil =
n∑
i=1
∑
l ∈[n]:νil >0
uilνil
∗
=
n∑
i=1
max
l ′∈[n]
{uil ′}
∑
l ∈[n]:νil >0
νil
∗∗
=
n∑
i=1
max
l ′∈[n]
{uil ′}
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
ν˜il max
l ∈[n]
{uil ′}
≥
n∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
ν˜iluil ,
where (∗) follows as νil > 0 only when uil is the maximum among all uil ′ for l ′ ∈ [n] and the
maximum is unique. In addition, (∗∗) follows as
∑
l ∈[n]:νil >0 νil = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Now we will
show that 1 ⇒ 2.
Suppose νil > 0. For a given l ′ ∈ [n], define ν˜ as follows:
ν˜i ′r =

νir if i
′
, i
νil + νil ′ if i
′
= i, r = l ′
0 if i ′ = i, r = l
νir if i
′
= i, r , l ′, r , l
Note that ν˜ ∈ C and by 2, we have
n∑
i ′=1
n∑
r=1
ui ′r (νi ′r − ν˜i ′r ) ≥ 0
⇒ uil ′(νil ′ − ν˜il ′) + uil (νil − ν˜il ) ≥ 0
⇒ −uil ′νil + uilνil ≥ 0
uil ≥ uil ′ .
As l ′ ∈ [n] is arbitrary, we deduce uil ≥ uil ′ for all l
′ ∈ [n]. Now, we will prove 3 ⇒ 2. For a given
i ∈ [n], let l ∈ [n] be such that νil > 0. Then we have, ξil = 0 by complementary constraint. This
gives us uil = κi ≥ κi − ξil ′ = uil ′ for all l
′ ∈ [n] as ξil ′ ≥ 0. This completes the proof.
Now, we will show 2 ⇒ 3. We will show that there exists κ ∈ Rn and ξ ∈ Rn×n such that 3
is satisfied. Define κi
∆
= maxl ′∈[n]{uil ′} which gives us ξil
∆
= −uil + κi for all i, l ∈ [n]. Thus, it is
trivially true that ξ ≥ 0n×n . In addition, if νil > 0 for some i, l ∈ [n], then uil ≥ uil ′ for all l ′ ∈ [n],
which implies that κi = uil and thus, ξil = 0. As i, l is arbitrary, we have ξilνil = 0 for all i, l ∈ [n].
This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 3. 1 ⇒ 2. For a given i ∈ [n], as Gi (
∑n
k=1 µ¯ik ) = maxl ∈[n]{uil }, we have
Gi (
∑n
k=1 µ¯ik ) ≥ uil for all l ∈ [n]. In addition, we also have
Gi
(
n∑
k=1
µ¯ik
)
≤ max
l ∈[n]
{uil }
∗
⇔ Gi
(
n∑
k=1
µ¯ik
)
≤ uil +M1{l=min{l ′∈[n]:uil′,maxl′′∈[n] {uil′′}}
∗∗
⇔ Gi
(
n∑
k=1
µ¯ik
)
≤ uil +M(1 − bil ),
n∑
l=1
bil = 1. (13)
For (∗) to hold true, we can pickM to be an upper bound on the left hand side which is
∑n
i=1Gi (〈1n, µ〉).
Next, (∗∗) follows by defining bil
∆
= 1{uil=maxl′∈[n] {uil′ }} if the maximizer is unique. In this case, we
will have
∑n
l=1 bil = 1. If the maximizer is not unique, it suffices to have bil = 1 for any one of the
maximizer (in particular, we pick the smallest l ) and zero for the rest. So
∑n
l=1 bil = 1 still holds.
This completes the proof. 2 ⇒ 1 follows from (13) along with the inequality Gi (
∑n
k=1 µ¯ik ) ≥ uil
for all l ∈ [n]. 
B THEOREM 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. For all η > 0, consider the Lyapunov functions V (qη) =
〈
1n+m, q
2
η
〉
for all η. We will
calculate the drift of this Lyapunov function and show that it is negative outside a finite set. We
have
E
[
∆V (qη(k))|qη(k)
]
= E
[〈
1n+m, qη(k + 1)
2〉 − 〈1n+m, qη(k)2〉 |qη (k)]
= E
[〈
1n+m,
(
qη(k) + aη (k) − xη (k)
)2〉
−
〈
1n+m, qη(k)
2
〉
|qη (k)
]
= E
[〈
1n+m,
(
aη(k) − xη (k)
)2〉
|qη (k)
]
︸                                          ︷︷                                          ︸
T1
+2E
[〈
qη(k), aη(k) − xη (k)
〉
|qη (k)
]︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
T2
.
Now, we will simplify T1 separately. First note that
0 ≤
〈
1n+m, xη (k)
〉
≤ 2
〈
1n+m, aη(k)
〉
w.p. 1,
as the matching policy is defined such that, at the beginning of each period, there won’t be any
customer-server compatible pairs waiting in the system. Thus, the maximum possible pairs that
can be matched in one time epoch is the total number of arrivals. So, we have
T1 = E
[〈
1n+m,
(
aη(k) − xη (k)
)2〉
|qη (k)
]
≤ E
[〈
1n+m, aη(k)
2
〉
|qη (k)
]
+ E
[〈
1n+m, xη (k)
2
〉
|qη (k)
]
=
n∑
i=1
(
σ 2i,1(qη) + Eαη (qη ) [µi ]
2
)
+
m∑
j=1
(
σ 2j,2(qη ) + (λi,η(qη ))
2
)
+ E
[〈
1n+m, xη(k)
2〉 |qη (k)]
≤
n∑
i=1
(
σ 2i,1 + Eα⋆ [µi ]
2
)
+
m∑
j=1
(
σ 2j,2 + (λ
⋆
i + 1)
2
)
+ E
[〈
1n+m, xη(k)
〉2
|qη (k)
]
≤
n∑
i=1
(
σ 2i,1 + Eα⋆ [µi ]
2
)
+
m∑
j=1
(
σ 2j,2 + (λ
⋆
i + 1)
2
)
+ 4E
[〈
1n+m, aη(k)
〉2
|qη (k)
]
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≤
n∑
i=1
(
σ 2i,1 + Eα⋆ [µi ]
2
)
+
m∑
j=1
(
σ 2j,2 + (λ
⋆
i + 1)
2
)
+ 41n×n ◦ Σ
(1)(α⋆) + 41m×m ◦ Σ
(2)
∆
= B1.
Now, we will simplify T2 below.
T2 = E
[〈
qη(k), aη(k) − xη (k)
〉
|qη (k)
]
= E
[〈
qη(k), aη(k)
〉
|qη (k)
]
− E
[〈
xη (k), qη(k)
〉
|qη(k)
]
=
〈
qη (k),E
[
aη(k)|qη(k)
]〉
− E
[
max
y∈(2)
〈
y, qη (k)
〉
|qη (k)
]
=
〈
q
(1)
η (k),Eα˜⋆ [µ]
〉
+
〈
q
(2)
η (k),λη(qη (k))
〉
− E
[
max
y∈(2)
〈
y, qη(k)
〉
|qη (k)
]
= −ϵη
〈
1m, q
(2)
η (k)
〉
+
〈
q
(1)
η (k),Eα˜⋆ [µ]
〉
+
〈
q
(2)
η (k), λ˜
⋆
〉
− E
[
max
y∈(2)
〈
y, qη (k)
〉
|qη(k)
]
= −ϵη
〈
1m, q
(2)
η (k)
〉
+
∑
(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j (q
(1)
i,η(k) + q
(2)
j,η (k)) − E
[
max
y∈(2)
〈
y, qη(k)
〉
|qη (k)
]
Lemma 7. For all η > 0, we have∑
(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j (q
(1)
i,η(k) + q
(2)
j,η(k)) − E
[
max
y∈(2)
〈
y, qη (k)
〉
|qη (k)
]
≤ −ϵη min
i ∈[n]

∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j

〈
1n, q
(1)
η (k)
〉
+ B2,
where B2 = Amax
∑
(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j (Eα⋆ [µi ] + λ˜
⋆
j ) + Amax
n∑
i=1
©­«
∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
Eα⋆ [µi ]
ª®¬ .
The proof of the Lemma 7 is provided at the end of the proof of the Lemma 4. Now, using the
Lemma 7, we have
T2 ≤ −ϵη
〈
1m, q
(2)
η (k)
〉
− ϵη min
i ∈[n]

∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j

〈
1n, q
(1)
η (k)
〉
+ B2
≤ −ϵη min
i ∈[n]

∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
, 1

〈
1n+m, qη (k)
〉
+ B2
Thus, we have
E
[
∆V (qη )|qη(k)
]
≤ B1 + 2B2 − 2ϵη min
i ∈[n]

∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
, 1

〈
1n+m, qη(k)
〉
.
So, there exists a finite set Bη such that for all q < Bη , we have E
[
∆V (qη)
]
< 0 where Bη is
defined as:
Bη =
qη ∈ Z
n+m
+
:
〈
1n+m, qη(k)
〉
≤
B1 + 2B2
ϵη mini ∈[n]
{∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
, 1
}  .
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: August 2020.
Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Markets with Strategic Servers 25
Thus, by the Foster-Lyapunov Theorem, the discrete time Markov chain for all η > 0 is positive
recurrent. Now, we can use the moment bound theorem, to get a bound on the expected queue
length in steady state. We have
E
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
≤
B1 + 2B2
2ϵη mini ∈[n]
{∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
, 1
}

Proof of Lemma. In this proof, we will omit the k and η dependence and write q, a and x for
qη (k), aη(k) and xη (k) respectively, for the ease of notation. The max-weight matching policy can
be re-written as follows:
x˜ = argmax
y˜
∑
(i, j)∈E
y˜i j (q
(1)
i + q
(2)
j ) (14a)
subject to q
(2)
j + a
(2)
j −
∑
i :(i, j)∈E
y˜i j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [m] (14b)
q
(1)
i + a
(1)
i −
∑
j :(i, j)∈E
y˜i j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n] (14c)
y˜i j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (14d)
Recall that, we allow y˜ to be a continuous variable as the constraint set is an integral polyhedron.
Thus, the linear program always have an optimal solution such that y˜ ∈ Z+. Note that for a given
q and a, a feasible solution to the above problem is
yˆi j = min
{
(a
(1)
i + q
(1)
i )
χ˜⋆i j
Eα˜⋆ [µi ]
, (a
(2)
j + q
(2)
j )
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
}
∀(i, j) ∈ E .
This can be easily verified as follows:∑
i :(i, j)∈E
yˆi j ≤ (a
(2)
j + q
(2)
j )
∑
i :(i, j)∈E χ˜
⋆
i j
λ˜⋆j
= a
(2)
j + q
(2)
j ∀j ∈ [m]∑
j :(i, j)∈E
yˆi j ≤ (a
(1)
i + q
(1)
i )
∑
j :(i, j)∈E χ˜
⋆
i j
Eα˜⋆ [µi ]
= a
(1)
i + q
(1)
i ∀i ∈ [n].
Wewill use this feasible solution to lower bound the objective function of (14). But before, observe
that as we are using max-weight matching policy, for all (i, j) ∈ E if q
(1)
i > 0 then q
(2)
j = 0. In other
words, at the start of each epoch, there are no compatible pairs waiting to be matched. So, we have
E
[
yˆi j |q
(1)
i > AmaxEα˜⋆ [µi ]
]
= E
[
min
{
(a
(1)
i + q
(1)
i )
χ˜⋆i j
Eα˜⋆ [µi ]
, (a
(2)
j + q
(2)
j )
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
} q(1)i > AmaxEα˜⋆ [µi ]]
= E
[
(a
(2)
j + q
(2)
j )
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
q(2)j = 0]
= E
[
a
(2)
j
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
q(2)j = 0] = χ˜⋆i j + ϵη χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
.
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Similarly, note that
E
[
yˆi j |q
(2)
j > Amaxλ˜
⋆
j
]
= E
[
min
{
(a
(1)
i + q
(1)
i )
χ˜⋆i j
Eα˜⋆ [µi ]
, (a
(2)
j + q
(2)
j )
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
} q(2)j > Amaxλ˜⋆j ]
= E
[
(a
(1)
i + q
(1)
i )
χ˜⋆i j
Eα˜⋆ [µi ]
q(1)i = 0]
= E
[
a
(1)
i
χ˜⋆i j
Eα˜⋆ [µi ]
q(1)i = 0] = χ˜⋆i j .
Now, we can lower bound the objective function as follows:
E
[
max
y˜∈(2)
〈y˜, q〉 |q
]
(a)
≥ E [〈yˆ, q〉 |q] =
∑
(i, j)∈E
E
[
yˆi j (q
(1)
i + q
(2)
j )|q
]
(b )
=
∑
(i, j)∈E
E
[
yˆi j (q
(1)
i + q
(2)
j )|q
(1)
i ,q
(2)
j
]
(c)
≥
∑
(i, j)∈E
E
[
yˆi j (q
(1)
i + q
(2)
j )1
{
q
(1)
i >AmaxEα˜⋆ [µi ]
} q(1)i ,q(2)j ]
+
∑
(i, j)∈E
E
[
yˆi j (q
(1)
i + q
(2)
j )1
{
q
(2)
j >Amaxλ˜
⋆
j
} q(1)i ,q(2)j ]
(d )
=
∑
(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
(
q
(1)
i 1
{
q
(1)
i >AmaxEα˜⋆ [µi ]
}
+ q
(2)
j 1
{
q
(2)
j >Amaxλ˜
⋆
j
})
+ ϵη
∑
(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
q
(1)
i 1
{
q
(1)
i >AmaxEα˜⋆ [µi ]
}
≥
∑
(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j (q
(1)
i + q
(2)
j ) + ϵη min
i ∈[n]

∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j

〈
1n, q
(1)
〉
− B2,
where
B2 = Amax
∑
(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j (Eα˜⋆ [µi ] + λ˜
⋆
j ) + Amax
n∑
i=1
©­«
∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
Eα˜⋆ [µi ]
ª®¬ .
The inequality (a) follows as yˆ is a feasible solution to the optimization problem.Next, (b) follows as
the feasible solution yˆi j only depends on q
(1)
i and q
(2)
j . The inequality (c) follows as for all (i, j) ∈ E,
only one of q
(1)
i and q
(2)
j can be non zero. Finally, (d) follows due to the following equation.
E
[
yˆi j (q
(1)
i + q
(2)
j )1
{
q
(2)
j >Amaxλ˜
⋆
j
} q(1)i ,q(2)j ] ∗= E [yˆi j |q(1)i ,q(2)j ] q(2)j 1{q(2)j >Amaxλ˜⋆j }
= χ˜⋆i jq
(2)
j 1
{
q
(2)
j >Amaxλ˜
⋆
j
} ,
where (∗) is true as the matching policy we are using the max-weight which makes sure there are
no compatible pairs waiting in the system at the start of a time epoch. 
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
We will prove the more general lemma give below and then use this lemma to prove the Lemma 5.
Lemma 8. For the server pricing policy given by α(q) = α˜⋆ for all q ∈ S and any given pricing
policy for customers and any matching policy under which the system is stable and E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] < ∞
the following holds:
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j ) + Fj (λ˜
⋆
j )
) (
E
[
λj (q¯)
]
− λ˜⋆j
)
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 8. Firstly, we will define a matrix to vector operation by stacking columns on
top of each other. For the matrix χ˜ , we will denote the corresponding vector by χˆ . We define it as
follows:
χˆk
∆
= χ˜i j where, i = k%(n + 1), j = ⌈
k
n
⌉ ∀k ∈ [nm].
Here k%n denotes the reminder obtained when k is divided by n and ⌈.⌉ is the ceiling function
which returns the smallest integer greater than or equal to the argument.
Add a constraint α˜ = α˜⋆ in the probabilistic fluid model to get the following optimization
problem:
R∗1 = max
λ˜, χ˜
д(λ˜, χ˜ ) =
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− Eα˜⋆ [c(µ˜)] (15a)
subject to h
(2)
j = λ˜j −
n∑
i=1
χ˜i j = 0 ∀j ∈ [m] (15b)
h
(1)
i = Eα˜
⋆ [µ˜i ] −
m∑
j=1
χ˜i j = 0 ∀i ∈ [n] (15c)
χ˜i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χ˜i j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (15d)
As the optimal value of (4) is achieved by the feasible point (λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆) for (15), we have R⋆1 ≥ R
⋆.
In addition, as we added a constraint, the feasible region of (15) is a subset of the feasible region of
(4), we have R⋆ ≥ R⋆1 . Thus, we have R
⋆
= R⋆1 and the optimal solution of (15) is (λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆). Now,
we will use the KKT conditions in the following steps:
(1) First, we will show that the optimal point is a regular point, that is all the binding constraints
are linearly independent.
(2) Then, we will use the given pricing policy to find a feasible direction for the optimization
problem above.
(3) Finally, we will use the first order KKT optimality conditions as the objective function is
concave and the feasible region is a polyhedron.
Part 1: Note that as Eα˜⋆ [µi ] > 0, it is not possible for χ˜
⋆
i j = 0 for all j ∈ [m]. In addition, as
the feasible region is a polyhedron, the gradient vectors of all the active constraints at the optimal
solution are linearly independent. Thus, the optimal point is a regular point.
Part 2: By hypothesis of the lemma, the DTMC operating under the given pricing and matching
policy is stable. Thus, by Lemma1, (E [λ(q¯)]),Eα˜⋆ [µ] , χ
†) is a feasible solution to the fluid problem
(4), where χ † is the corresponding ‘average’ rate assignment matrix (χ˜ ) for the given policy. Thus,
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a feasible direction at the optimal point is given by
d =
{
E
[
λj (q)
]
− λ⋆j ∀k ∈ [m]
χˆ†
k
− χˆ⋆
k
∀k ∈ [nm]\[m].
Part 3: Now, we will use the first order KKT optimality conditions for the optimization problem
(15). There exists unique Lagrangian multipliers (κ , ξ ) ∈ Rm+n × Rmn
+
such that,
∇д(λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆) + ∇h(λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆)κ +
∑
k :(k%(n+1), ⌈ kn ⌉)∈E
ξkek+n+m1 χˆ⋆
k
=0 +
∑
k :(k%(n+1), ⌈ kn ⌉)<E
ξkek+n+m = 0n+m+nm,
where ∇д(λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆) is the gradient of the objective function at the optimal point given by
∇д(λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆) =
(
F ′(λ˜
⋆
)λ˜
⋆
+ F (λ˜
⋆
), 0nm
)
.
In addition, as h : Rn+nm → Rn+m , its gradient ∇h((λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆)) is a matrix in R(m+mn)×(m+n) . Now,
we will take the inner product of the optimality equation with the feasible direction d . Observe
that 〈
d,∇h
(2)
j
〉
= h
(2)
j (λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆) − h
(2)
j (E [λ(q¯)] , χ
†) = 0 ∀j ∈ [m]〈
d,∇h
(1)
i
〉
= h
(1)
i (λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆) − h
(1)
i (E [λ(q¯)] , χ
†) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n]∑
k :(k%(n+1), ⌈ kn ⌉)∈E
ξk (χˆ
⋆
k − χˆ
†
k
)1 χˆ⋆
k
=0 = 0 (By the assumption χ˜
⋆
> 0n×m)∑
k :(k%(n+1), ⌈ kn ⌉)<E
ξk (χˆ
⋆
k − χˆ
†
k
) = 0 (As χ˜⋆i j = χ˜
†
i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E )
Thus, we have
〈
∇д(λ˜
⋆
, χ˜⋆), d
〉
= 0. This gives us the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 5. First note that, the sequence of DTMC operating under the pricing and
matching policy given by (8) (9) is stable. In addition, E
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
< ∞ by the hypothesis of
the Lemma 5. Thus, we can use Lemma 8. We have
E
[
λj,η (q¯)
]
= λ˜⋆j + ϵη
(
P
[
q
(2)
j,η = 0
]
− P
[
q
(2)
j,η > 0
])
∀j ∈ [m].
This give us
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′(λ˜⋆j ) + Fj (λ˜
⋆
j )
) (
P
[
q
(2)
j,η > 0
]
− P
[
q
(2)
j,η = 0
] )
= 0.

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B.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We have
LPη (πη)
η
= R⋆ − Pη (πη)
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
− Eα˜⋆ [c(µ)] − E
[〈
F
(
λη (q¯η)
)
,λη (q¯η)
〉]
+ Eα˜⋆ [c(µ)]
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
− E
[〈
F
(
λη(q¯η)
)
,λη (q¯η)
〉]
(a)
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
−
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j + ϵη
)
Fj
(
λ˜⋆j + ϵη
)
P
[
q
(2)
j,η = 0
]
−
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j − ϵη
)
Fj
(
λ˜⋆j − ϵη
)
P
[
q
(2)
j,η > 0
]
(b )
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
−
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j + ϵη
) (
Fj (λ˜
⋆
j ) + ϵηF
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j ) +
ϵ2η
2
F ′′(λ˜⋆j ) +O
(
ϵ2η
))
P
[
q
(2)
j,η = 0
]
−
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j − ϵη
) (
Fj (λ˜
⋆
j ) − ϵηF
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j ) +
(ϵη)
2
2
F ′′(λ˜⋆j ) +O
(
ϵ2η
))
P
[
q
(2)
j,η > 0
]
= ϵη
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j ) + Fj (λ˜
⋆
j )
) (
P
[
q
(2)
j,η > 0
]
− P
[
q
(2)
j,η = 0
])
− ϵ2η
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
+O
(
ϵ2η
)
(c)
= − ϵ2η
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
+O
(
ϵ2η
)
where (a) follows by the definition of the pricing policy given by (8). Next, (b) follows by Taylor’s
series expansion and using the Assumption 1 that the demand curve Fj (.) is twice continuously
differentiable. Finally, (c) follows by Lemma 5. Also, note that
1
2
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
+
〈
1m , F
′(λ˜
⋆
)
〉
=
1
2
(〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
+
〈
1m, F
′(λ˜
⋆
)
〉)
+
1
2
〈
1m, F
′(λ˜
⋆
)
〉
< 0,
as by Assumption 2, Fj (λj )λj is a concave function, thus the second derivative is non positive and
by Assumption 1, the demand function is strictly decreasing, thus the derivative is negative. 
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The net profit loss is given by
Lη = R
⋆
η − Rη
= R⋆η − Pη + sE
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
(a)
= −ηϵ2η
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
+O
(
ηϵ2η
)
+ sE
[〈
1n+m, q¯η
〉]
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(b )
≤ −ηϵ2η
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
+
s(B1 + 2B2)
2mini ∈[n]
{∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
, 1
} 1
ϵη
+O
(
ηϵ2η
)
(c)
= O
(
η1/3
)
,
where (a) follows by Lemma 6, (b) follows by Lemma 4 and (c) follows by picking ϵη = η
−1/3
considering the trade-off between the profit loss (ηϵ2η ) and the expected queue length (
1
ϵη
). This
completes the proof. 
C LOWER BOUND
Proof of Theorem 5. We will start by defining the imbalance of the DTMC given by
z
∆
=
〈
1n, q
(1)
〉
−
〈
1m, q
(2)
〉
.
The update equation of imbalance given the queue length vector q(k) can be written as
z(k + 1) = z(k) +
〈
1n, a
(1)(k)
〉
−
〈
1m, a
(2)(k)
〉
.
Note, that z itself is not a Markov chain as the arrival vector (a(k)) depends on the queue length
(q(k)). Denote γ
∆
= max{m,n} and also denote p
∆
= P [z¯ ≥ 0], that is
p =
∞∑
x=0
∑
q:〈1n,q(1)〉−〈1m,q(2)〉=x
P [q¯ = q] .
For this proof, we will couple the absolute value of the imbalance with a single server queue
denoted by q† and arrival and service rate denoted by a† and s†. In particular, we will carry out
the proof in the following steps:
(1) First, we will construct the arrival and service process of the single server queue q†(k).
(2) Then, we will couple the single server queue with the imbalance such that q†(k) ≤ |z(k)| for
all k ∈ Z+
(3) Then we will calculate E
[
q¯†
]
and use this to lower bound E [〈1n+m, q¯〉].
Step 1 (Single Server Queue): For all k ≥ 0, generate the following random variables independent
of all the other random variables:
s†1 (k) ≥s .t .
〈
1n, a
(1)(k)
〉
; E
[
s†1 (k)
]
=
〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
+ γϵ, Var
[
s†1 (k)
]
= 1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
s†2 (k) ≥s .t .
〈
1n, a
(2)(k)
〉
; E
[
s†2 (k)
]
=
〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
+ γϵ, Var
[
s†2 (k)
]
= 1n×n ◦ Σ
(2)
a†1(k) ≤s .t .
〈
1n, a
(1)(k)
〉
; E
[
a†1(k)
]
=
〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
− γϵ, Var
[
a†1(k)
]
= 1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
a†2(k) ≤s .t .
〈
1n, a
(2)(k)
〉
; E
[
a†2(k)
]
=
〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
− γϵ, Var
[
a†2(k)
]
= 1n×n ◦ Σ
(2)
.
In addition, we also have s†i (k) ≤ γAmax and a
†
i (k) ≤ γAmax with probability 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Note that
〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
= 〈1n,Eα˜⋆ [µ]〉 by the constraints of the probabilistic fluid model (4). Thus,
it is possible to generate such random variables as their mean is greater than or equal to the
corresponding arrival process of the imbalance and their variance are equal. Now, we define the
arrival and service process of the single server queue. Consider a random variabley ∼ Bernoulli(p)
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independent of s†1 , s
†
2 , a
†
1 and a
†
2 . For all k ∈ Z+, we define
s†(k) = s†1 (k)1{y<0} + s
†
2 (k)1{y≥0}
a†(k) = a†1(k)1{y≥0} + a
†
2(k)1{y<0}
The marginal distribution of the arrival and service process is given by
P
[
s†(k) ≤ x
]
= (1 − p)P
[
s†1 (k) ≤ x
]
+ pP
[
s†2 (k) ≤ x
]
∀x ∈ R
P
[
a†(k) ≤ x
]
= pP
[
a†1(k) ≤ x
]
+ (1 − p)P
[
a†2(k) ≤ x
]
∀x ∈ R.
Note that the arrival and service process are not independent and the mean and variance of them
are
E
[
s†(k)
]
=
〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
+ γϵ ; Var
[
s†(k)
]
= p1 ◦ Σ(1) + (1 − p)1 ◦ Σ(2)
E
[
a†(k)
]
=
〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
− γϵ ; Var
[
a†(k)
]
= p1 ◦ Σ(1) + (1 − p)1 ◦ Σ(2)
Cov
[
a†(k), s†(k)
]
= 0.
The variance can be calculated as follows
Var
[
a†(k)
]
= E
[
(a†(k))2
]
− E
[
a†(k)
]2
= E
[ (
a†1(k)1{y≥0} + a
†
2(k)1{y<0}
)2]
− E
[
a†1(k)1{y≥0} + a
†
2(k)1{y<0}
]2
= E
[
(a†1(k))
2
]
p + E
[
(a†2(k))
2
]
(1 − p) −
(〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
− γϵ
)2
=
(
Var
[
a†1(k)
]
+ E
[
a†1(k)
]2)
p +
(
Var
[
a†2(k)
]
+ E
[
a†2(k)
]2)
(1 − p) −
(〈
1m, λ˜
⋆
〉
− γϵ
)2
= p1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ (1 − p)1m×m ◦ Σ
(2)
.
Similarly, we can also calculate the variance of s†(k) and we omit it here as the steps are repetitive.
In addition, we can also find the co-variance between the arrival and service process as follows:
Cov
[
a†(k), s†(k)
]
= E
[
a†(k)s†(k)
]
− E
[
a†(k)
]
E
[
s†(k)
]
= E
[(
a†1(k)1{y≥0} + a
†
2(k)1{y<0}
) (
s†1 (k)1{y<0} + s
†
2 (k)1{y≥0}
)]
− E
[
a†1(k)1{y≥0} + a
†
2(k)1{y<0}
]
E
[
s†1 (k)1{y<0} + s
†
2 (k)1{y≥0}
]
= pE
[
a†1(k)s
†
2 (k)
]
+ (1 − p)E
[
a†2(k)s
†
1 (k)
]
−
〈
1m , λ˜
⋆
〉2
+ γ 2ϵ2 = 0,
where the last equality follows as a†1 , a
†
2 , s
†
1 and s
†
2 are independent of each other.
Step 2 (Coupling):We couple the arrival and service process of the multiple link two sided queue
and the single server queue as follows: If z(k) ≥ 0 then s†(k) ≥ a2(k) and a†(k) ≤ a1(k) with
probability 1. Also, if z(k) < 0, then a†(k) ≤ a2(k) and s†(k) ≥ a1(k). Note that, such a coupling
is possible if P [z(k) ≥ 0] = p for all k ∈ Z+. To achieve this, we will initialize z(k) appropriately.
Now, we prove by induction that under the above defined coupling, q†(k) ≤ |z(k)| for all k ∈ Z+.
Base Case: Initialize q(0) by its stationary distribution, so we have
P [z(k) = x] =
∑
q:〈1n,q(1)〉−〈1m,q(2)〉=x
P [q¯ = q] ∀x ∈ Z, ∀k ∈ Z+.
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In addition, initialize q†(0) with the same distribution as |z(0)|. As both of the them has the same
distribution, we can couple the two random variables such that q†(0) = |z(0)|. So, the base case is
satisfied. In addition, P [z(k) > 0] = p for all k ∈ Z+.
Induction Hypothesis: q†(k ′) ≤ |z(k ′)| for all k ′ ∈ [k].
Induction Step:We will consider the following two cases:
Case I: z(k) ≥ 0. In this case, we have s†(k) ≥ a2(k) and a†(k) ≤ a1(k). So, we have
q†(k + 1) = max
{
0,q†(k) + a†(k) − s†(k)
}
≤ max
{
0, z(k) + a†(k) − s†(k)
}
(Induction Hypothesis)
≤ max {0, z(k) + a1(k) − a2(k)} (Coupling)
≤ |z(k) + a1(k) − a2(k)| = |z(k + 1)|.
Case II: z(k) < 0. In this case, we have a†(k) ≤ a2(k) and s†(k) ≥ a1(k). So, we have
q†(k + 1) = max
{
0,q†(k) + a†(k) − s†(k)
}
= −min
{
0,−q†(k) − a†(k) + s†(k)
}
≤ −min
{
0, z(k) − a†(k) + s†(k)
}
(Induction Hypothesis)
≤ −min {0, z(k) − a2(k) + a1(k)} (Coupling)
≤ |z(k + 1)|.
This completes our proof that q†(k) ≤ |z(k)| for all k ∈ Z+. Thus, P
[
q†(k) ≤ x
]
≥ P [|z(k)| ≤ x]
for all x ∈ R+. Taking the limit as k goes to infinity, we get P
[
q¯† ≤ x
]
≥ P [|z¯ | ≤ x] and thus, we
have E
[
q¯†
]
≤ E [|z¯ |].
Step 3 (E
[
q¯†
]
): Now, we will analyze the single server queue to find its expectation in steady
state. By taking V (q†) = (q†)2 as the Lyapunov function, in steady state, we have
E
[
∆V (q¯†)
]
= 0 ⇒ E
[
(q¯†,+)2 − (q¯†)2
]
= 0
⇒ E
[
(q¯†,+ − u¯† + u¯†)2 − (q¯†)2
]
= 0
⇒ E
[
(q¯† + a¯† − s¯†)2 − (u¯†)2 − (q¯†)2
]
= 0
⇒ E
[
(a¯† − s¯†)2 + 2q¯†(a¯† − s¯†) − (u¯†)2
]
= 0
⇒ Var
[
a¯†
]
+ Var
[
s†
]
− 2Cov
[
a¯†, s¯†
]
+ E
[
a¯† − s¯†
]2
− 4γϵE
[
q¯†
]
− 2γ 2Amaxϵ
∗
= 0, (16)
where (∗) follows by taking V (q†) = q† as the Lyapunov function. We have
E
[
∆V (q¯†)
]
= 0 ⇒ E
[
q¯†,+ − q¯†
]
= 0 ⇒ E
[
a¯† − s¯† + u¯†
]
= 0 ⇒ E
[
u¯†
]
= 2γϵ .
In addition, as u¯† ≤ s¯† ≤ γAmax, we have E
[
(u¯†)2
]
≤ γAmaxE
[
u¯†
]
= 2γ 2Amaxϵ . Now, simplifying
(16), we get
⇒ E
[
q¯†
]
=
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2)
+ 4γ 2ϵ2 − 2γ 2Amaxϵ
4γϵ
≥
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4γϵ
∀ϵ ≤
1
2γ 2Amax
Thus, we have
E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] ≥ E [|z¯ |] ≥ E
[
q¯†
]
≥
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4γϵ
∀ϵ ≤
1
2γ 2Amax

, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: August 2020.
Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Markets with Strategic Servers 33
We now present a lemma which will assist us in proving Theorem 6.
Lemma 9. Under the hypothesis of Theorem 6, there exists a constant δ > 0 independent of η and
η1 > 0 such that for all η > η1
E
[
m∑
j=1
ϕ2j (
q¯η
ηα
)
]
≥ δ
Proof of Lemma 9. In this proof, we will couple the sequence of DTMCs {qη (k) : k ∈ Z+} with
a sequence of single server queues q†η with arrival and service defined as in the proof of Theorem
5 with ϵ dependent on η. In particular, we have ϵη = Mη
β . By the coupling defined above, we have
P
[
q¯†η > x
]
≤ P
[
|z¯η | > x
]
for all x > 0. In addition, we know that as η → ∞, we have ϵη → 0 as
β < 1. Thus, by [13] we know that
ϵηq¯
†
η
d
→ Exp
(
σ 2s =
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2)
4γ
)
Even though, in [13] they assume the arrival process and service process are independent of each
other, it suffices to have them uncorrelated. Now, by the definition of weak convergence, forK > 0
lim
η→∞
P
[
ϵηq¯
†
η > (n +m)KM
]
= e
−
(n+m)KM
σ 2s .
Thus, for a given K > 0, there exists η1(K) > 0 such that for all η > η1, we have
P
[
ϵηq¯
†
η > (n +m)KM
]
≥
1
2
e
−
(n+m)KM
σ 2s
Now, by using the coupling, we have
P
[
|zη | > (n +m)Kη
α
]
≥ P
[
q†η > (n +m)Kη
α
]
= P
[
Mηβq†η > (n +m)KMη
α+β
]
≥ P
[
ϵηq
†,η
> (n +m)KM
]
≥
1
2
e
−
(n+m)KM
σ 2s ∀η > η1
Finally, note that {zη > (n +m)Kη
α } ⊆ {||q¯η | |∞ > Kη
α }, so we have
E
[
m∑
j=1
ϕ2j
(
q¯η
ηα
)]
≥ σ 2P
[
| |q¯η | |∞ > Kη
α
]
≥ σ 2P
[
zη > (n +m)Kη
α
]
≥
σ 2
2
e
−
(n+m)KM
σ 2s
∆
= δ ∀η > η1.

Proof of Theorem 6. In this proof, we will use Taylor’s theorem to expand the profit-loss and
show that the second order term does not vanish using Lemma 9. This proof follows similarly as
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in [26]. The only non trivial step was to prove Lemma 9.
R∗η − Pη
η
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
− Eα˜⋆ [c(µ)] − E
[〈
F
(
λη (q¯η)
)
,λη (q¯η)
〉]
+ Eα˜⋆ [c(µ)]
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
− E
[〈
F
(
λη(q¯η )
)
,λη(q¯η)
〉]
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
−
m∑
j=1
E
[(
λ˜⋆j + ϕ j
(
q¯η
ηα
))
Fj
(
λ˜⋆j + ϕ j
(
q¯η
ηα
))]
=
〈
F (λ˜
⋆
), λ˜
⋆
〉
−
m∑
j=1
E
[(
λ˜⋆j + ϕ j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
ηβ
) (
Fj (λ˜
⋆
j ) + ϕ j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )η
β
+ ϕ2j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))η
2β
)]
= −
(
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ j
(
q¯η
ηα
)] (
Fj (λ˜
⋆
j ) + λ˜
⋆
j F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
))
ηβ −
(
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ2j
(
q¯η
ηα
) (
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))λ˜
⋆
j + F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)])
η2β
−
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ3j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))
]
η3β
(a)
= −
(
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ2j
(
q¯η
ηα
) (
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))λ˜
⋆
j + F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)] )
η2β −
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ3j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))
]
η3β
(b )
≥
δ
2
(
min
j∈[m]
{
−F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )λ˜
⋆
j − F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
})
η2β −
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ3j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))
]
η3β
(c)
≥
δ
4
(
min
j∈[m]
{
−F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )λ˜
⋆
j − F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
})
η2β .
The remainder term of the Taylor’s expansion is F ′′(λˆ⋆(q¯η )) for some λˆ
⋆(q¯η) ∈ [λ˜
⋆
j −Mη
β
, λ˜⋆j +
Mηβ ] for all q¯η ∈ S . Note that the second derivative of λjF (λj ) is negative as it is concave by As-
sumption 2 and Fj (.) is strictly decreasing by Assumption 1. Thus, the coefficient of η
2β is positive.
This completes the proof. Now we will justify (a), (b) and (c) below. Proof of (a) follows by Lemma
8.
Proof of (b) follows by uniform convergence of F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η)) to F
′′(λ˜⋆j ). To expound, by Taylor’s
Theorem and Condition 3 (a), we have λˆ⋆j (q¯η) ∈ [λ
⋆
j −Mη
β
, λ⋆j +Mη
β ]. By Assumption 1, F ′′(.) is
continuous, thus, given γ¯ = 12 minj∈[m]
{
−F ′′j (λ
⋆
j ) − F
′
j (λ
⋆
j )/λ
⋆
j
}
> 0, there exists δ2 > 0, such that
for all |λ˜⋆j − λ
⋆
j | < δ2, we have |F
′′(λ˜⋆j ) − F
′′(λ⋆j )| < γ¯ . Thus, for all η >
(
δ2
M
)1/β
, we have
sup
q¯η ∈S
|F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η)) − F
′′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )| < γ¯ ∀j ∈ [m].
Thus, we have
−
(
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ2j
(
q¯η
ηα
) (
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))λ
⋆
j + F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)])
≥
(
m∑
j=1
(
−F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )λ˜
⋆
j − γ¯ λ˜
⋆
j − F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
E
[
ϕ2j
(
q¯η
ηα
)] )
∗
≥
1
2
(
m∑
j=1
(
−F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )λ˜
⋆
j − F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
E
[
ϕ2j
(
q¯η
ηα
)] )
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∗∗
≥
δ
2
(
min
j∈[m]
{
−F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )λ˜
⋆
j − F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
})
where (∗) follows by the definition of γ¯ and (∗∗) follows by Lemma 9.
Proof of (c) follows as η3β is of lower order than η2β as β < 0. In particular
−
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ3j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
F ′′j (λˆ
⋆
j (q¯η))
]
η3β ≥ −
3
2
m∑
j=1
E
[ϕ3j ( q¯ηηα ) F ′′j (λ˜⋆j )] η3β ∀η > η2
≥ −
3M3
2
m∑
j=1
|F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )|η
3β
∀η > η2
Now, as β < 0, with η3
∆
= ( 6M
3
δ minj∈[m]
{
−F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )λ˜
⋆
j −F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
} ∑m
j=1 |F
′′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )|)
−1/β for all η > max{η2,η3},
we have
m∑
j=1
E
[
ϕ3j
(
q¯η
ηα
)
F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
]
η3β ≥ −
δ
4
(
min
j∈[m]
{
−F ′′j (λ˜
⋆
j )λ˜
⋆
j − F
′
j (λ˜
⋆
j )
})
η2β
This completes the proof. 
D THEOREM 8
Proof of Theorem 8. In this proof we will use Lemma 4, Theorem 5 and Lemma 6. First, by
Lemma 4, with ϵη = ϵ
′, we have
E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] ≤
B1 + 2B2
2mini ∈[n]
{∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
, 1
} 1
ϵ ′
.
As, E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] = C , we have
ϵ ′ ≤
B1 + 2B2
2mini ∈[n]
{∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ˜⋆j
, 1
} 1
C
.
Now, by Lemma 6, with η such that ϵη = ϵ
′, we have
LP
∗
=
LPη
η
= −(ϵ ′)2
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
+O
(
(ϵ ′)2
)
∗∗
≤ −
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
) ©­­«
B1 + 2B2
2mini ∈[n]
{∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χ˜⋆i j
λ⋆j
, 1
} ª®®¬
2
1
C2
+O
(
1
C2
)
where, (∗) follows by the definition of asymptotic regime 2 and as
∑m
j=1
(
λ⋆j F
′′(λ⋆j )
2 + F
′
j (λ
⋆
j )
)
<
0, (∗∗) follows. This completes one part of the proof. Now, as the two price policy satisfies the
hypothesis of Theorem 5 with ϵ = ϵ ′, we have
E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] ≥
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}ϵ ′
.
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As, E [〈1n+m, q¯〉] = C , we have
ϵ ′ ≥
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}
1
C
.
Now, again by Lemma 3, we have
LP = −(ϵ
′)2
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
)
+O
(
(ϵ ′)2
)
≥ −
m∑
j=1
(
λ˜⋆j F
′′(λ˜⋆j )
2
+ F ′j (λ˜
⋆
j )
) (
1n×n ◦ Σ
(1)
+ 1m×m ◦ Σ
(2) − 1
4max{m,n}
)2
1
C2
+O
(
1
C2
)
.
This, completes the proof. 
E COST FUNCTION AND ITS VARIATIONS
E.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of 1. The domain of c1∗(.) is a subset of the domain of c
1
∗∗ which is R
n
+
and they are equal
for all µ ∈ Ω. Thus, c1∗∗ ≤ c
1
∗ for all µ ∈ R
n
+
. So, we have
Eα
[
c1∗(µ)
]
≥ Eα
[
c1∗∗(µ)
] ∗
≥ c1∗∗(Eα [µ]) ∀α ∈ P,
where (∗) follows as c1∗∗(.) is convex by definition. Thus, we have
R1∗ = max
λ˜, α˜, χ˜
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− Eα˜
[
c1∗(µ˜)
]
≤
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− c1∗∗ (Eα˜ [µ˜])
subject to, λ˜j =
n∑
i=1
χ˜i j ∀j ∈ [m] Eα˜ [µ˜i ] =
m∑
j=1
χ˜i j ∀i ∈ [n]
χ˜i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χ˜i j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
Now, substituting Eα˜ [µ˜] = µ and c
1
∗∗(µ) = 〈G(µ), µ〉 in the above optimization problem, we get
max
λ˜,µ, χ˜
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− 〈G(µ), µ〉 = R1∗∗
subject to, λ˜j =
n∑
i=1
χ˜i j ∀j ∈ [m] µi =
m∑
j=1
χ˜i j ∀i ∈ [n]
χ˜i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χ˜i j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
This shows thatR1∗ ≤ R
1
∗∗. Now, if the condition cil ≥ Gl (µ
∗∗,1
l
)−Gi (µ
∗∗,1
i ) for all i, l ∈ [n] is satisfied,
then µ∗∗,1 ∈ Ω. Thus, α˜ = µ∗∗,1 with probability 1 is a feasible solution and we have R1∗∗ ≤ R
1
∗. This
completes the proof. 
E.2 Strong Duality
By solving the primal formulation in the previous section, we noticed that it is taking more than
a day to solve for the case of SD and β-IC for small values of β and it does not scale well with
the graph. In addition, as Gurobi is implementing branch and bound, the simulation uses a lot
of memory. In this section, we will analyze the dual of the fluid optimization problem and prove
that strong duality holds and later solve the dual problem numerically. It turns out that the dual
problem is a convex optimization problem and thus, standard optimization methods like (accel-
erated) gradient descent can be employed to solve this problem. We will start by presenting the
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Lagrangian function L : Rn+m ×Rm ×P ×R |E | → R¯ with κ ∈ Rm+n as the dual variables. Here, P
is the set of measures defined on the Borel sigma algebra generated by Ω. The Lagrangian function
L(κ , (λ,α , χ )) is given by
〈F (λ),λ〉 − Eα [c(µ)] +
n∑
j=1
κ
(2)
j
©­«λj −
∑
i :(i, j)∈E
χi j
ª®¬ +
n∑
i=1
κ
(1)
i
©­«Eα [µi ] −
∑
j :(i, j)∈E
χi j
ª®¬ .
The domain of the above defined Lagrangian function is Rn+m ×Y where Y ⊂ Rm ×P×R |E | given
by
Y =
{
(λ,α , χ ) ∈ Rm
+
× P × R
|E |
+
:
∫
Ω
dα = 1,α  0
}
.
In words, we are imposing the constraints that the arrival rates λ and the rate of matching χ is
non negative and in addition, α is restricted only to a set of probability measures. The Lagrangian
function is defined to be −∞ outside its domain by convention as we are maximizing with respect
to (λ,α , χ ). Now, the dual function can be written as follows:
D∗ = min
κ ∈Rm+n
{
max
(λ,α , χ )∈Y
L(κ , (λ,α , χ ))
}
.
This can be expanded by substituting the expression on L and then separating the inner maximiza-
tion to get
min
κ ∈Rm+n
{
n∑
j=1
max
λj ∈R+
{
Fj (λj )λj + κ
(2)
j λj
}
− min
α ∈P:
∫
Ω
dα=1,α 0
Eα
[
c(µ) −
n∑
i=1
µiκ
(1)
i
]
−
∑
(i, j)∈E
min
χi j ≥0
{
χi j
(
κ
(2)
j + κ
(1)
i
)}
The second minimization can be reduced to minimizing only over all the Dirac measures as taking
a convex combination will only increase the objective function value. In addition, if κ
(1)
i +κ
(2)
j < 0,
then χi j can be taken arbitrarily large which will make the objective function arbitrarily large
and, if κ
(1)
i + κ
(2)
j ≥ 0, then the minimization is achieved at χi j = 0. Thus, the above optimization
problem can be reduced to the following:
min
κ ∈Rm+n
{
n∑
j=1
max
λj ∈R+
{
Fj (λj )λj + κ
(2)
j λj
}
−min
µ ∈Ω
{
c(µ) −
n∑
i=1
µiκ
(1)
i
}}
(17a)
subject to, κ
(1)
i + κ
(2)
j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (17b)
Note that, the above optimization problem is a convex optimization problem with affine con-
straints asmaxλj ≥0{Fj (λj )λj+κ
(2)
j λ
(2)
j } is the conjugate of the function−Fj (λj )λj and−minµ ∈Ω{c(µ)−∑n
i=1 µiκ
(1)
i } is the conjugate of the function c(µ) and thus it is convex. Next, we show that there is
no duality gap between the fluid optimization problem and its dual. The result is presented below:
Proposition 4. The optimal values of the problems (4) and (17) are equal, that is R∗ = D∗.
The proof of the proposition follows by verifying some regularity conditions and the details are
presented in the appendix. As the dual (17) is a convex optimization problem with finite number
of variables and constraints, it is easier to solve it compared to the primal. The above proposition
allows us to solve the dual rather than the primal.
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E.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We will use the Theorem 7.10 from the lectures on stochastic programming [23]. We
will verify the following three conditions:
(1) For every κ ∈ Rn+m , the function L(κ , .) is concave.
(2) For every (λ,α , χ ), the function L(., (λ,α , χ )) is convex and lower semi continuous.
(3) The dual optimization problem (17) has a nonempty and bounded set of optimal solutions.
Proof of 1. If κ : κ(1)i +κ
(2)
j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E, then we know that L(κ , .) is concave with respect to λ
by Assumption 2, and affine with respect to α and χ in its domain Y which is convex. In addition,
if κ does not belong to the above set, then L(κ, .) = ∞ which is concave.
Proof of 2. For (λ,α , χ ) ∈ Y , L(., (λ,α , χ )) is an affine function of κ , thus it is convex and lower
semi continuous. For (λ,α , χ ) < Y , we have L(., (λ,α , χ )) = −∞ everywhere and thus it is convex
and lower semi continuous.
Proof of 3. We already know that the dual objective function is convex and the constraints are
affine. Now, we will show that the objective function is coercive which will suffice to show that
the optimal solution is nonempty and bounded. Let λ⋆j > 0 and λ
⋆
j ∈ domFj for all j ∈ [m] and
µ⋆ > 0m and µ
⋆ ∈ Ω. Then we have
sup
λj ≥0
{
Fj (λj )λj + κ
(2)
j λj
}
≥ max
{
0, Fj (λ
⋆
j )λ
⋆
j + κ
(2)
j λ
⋆
j
}
inf
µ≥0m
{
c(µ⋆) −
〈
κ (1), µ⋆
〉}
≤ min
{
0, c(µ) −
〈
κ (1), µ
〉}
The above results in the following lower bound on the objective function of the dual (17).
m∑
j=1
max
{
0, Fj (λ
⋆
j )λ
⋆
j + κ
(2)
j λ
⋆
j
}
−min
{
0, c(µ⋆) −
〈
κ (1), µ⋆
〉}
. (18)
Now, if | |κ | | → ∞ such that κ
(1)
i +κ
(2)
j ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E, then there exists an i ∈ [n] or a j ∈ [m]
such that either κ
(1)
i → ∞ or κ
(2)
j → ∞. This is true by the assumption that the bipartite graph is
connected. This implies that (18) → ∞. Thus, the objective function of the dual (17) → ∞. Thus,
it is coercive. This completes the proof. 
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